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1. Find all Nash equilibria of the following game Player 2 Right Left Up 1,4 5,-3...
Find all the Nash equilibria in the following game and indicate which are strict. Player 2...
Find all the Nash equilibria in the following game and indicate which are strict. Player 2 d b a -1,4 1,-3 2,7 W 2,7 Player 1 2.1 0,4 1, 3 1, 2 Y -1,6 6,2 3.2 1,1 Z 7,1 5.2 0.2 3,1 O (Wa) and (W,c). Neither are strict. O (W,c) and (Z,b). Both are strict O (Wc) and (Z,b). Neither are strict. O There are no Nash equilibria in this game.
2. Find all Nash equilibria (including MSNE) in the following game. Player 2 M Actions L R Player 1,3 2,-2 3,1 1,4 5,0...
2. Find all Nash equilibria (including MSNE) in the following game. Player 2 M Actions L R Player 1,3 2,-2 3,1 1,4 5,0 (Hint: first, show that some action is strictly dominated. Then, find all MSNE in the reduced game).
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4...
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
Find the Nash Equilibria of the following game Habtamu Left $4, $3 $6, $4 Right Up...
Find the Nash Equilibria of the following game Habtamu Left $4, $3 $6, $4 Right Up $7, $8 Dessie Down $3, $3
Determine ALL of the Nash equilibria (pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria) of the following 3 games: Player...
Determine ALL of the Nash equilibria
(pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria) of
the following 3 games:
Player 1 H T Player 2 HT (1, -1) (-1,1) | (-1,1) (1, -1) | Н Player 1 H D Player 2 D (2, 2) (3,1) | (3,1) |(2,2) | Player 2 A (2, 2) (0,0) Player 1 A B B (0,0) | (3,4)
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: &n...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2...
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2 b3 a1 1,3 2,2 1,2 a2 2,3 2,3 2,1 a3 1,1 1,2 3,2 a4 1,2 3,1 2,3 Player 1 b.) Player 2 A B C D A 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 B 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 C 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 D 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 Player 1 c.) Player 2 S B S 3,2 1,1 B 0,0 2,3
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down...
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down 2,1 2,2 In regards to Nash equilibium, we can say that: A. there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right B. Bottom/Right is an unstable yet social optimum, therefore a Nash equilibrium C. Bottom/Right is the only Nash equlibrium D. there are zero Nash equilibria
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down...
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down 2,1 2,2 In regards to Nash equilibium, we can say that: A. there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right B. Bottom/Right is an unstable yet social optimum, therefore a Nash equilibrium C. Bottom/Right is the only Nash equlibrium D. there are zero Nash equilibria
Question 3 Consider the game in figure 3. Player 2 LR 3,3 1,4 Player 1 4,1...
Question 3 Consider the game in figure 3. Player 2 LR 3,3 1,4 Player 1 4,1 2,2 Figure 3: A Prisoner's Dilemma game. Assume that the payoffs in the figure are $ values. (i) Assume that both players have risk neutral utility functions. Find all of the Nash equilibria of this game. (ii) Next, assume that the row player has other regarding preferences with a = 0 and B = 3 (while the column player has the same preferences as...
Find all the Nash equilibria in the following game and indicate which are strict. Player 2 d b a -1,4 1,-3 2,7 W 2,7 Player 1 2.1 0,4 1, 3 1, 2 Y -1,6 6,2 3.2 1,1 Z 7,1 5.2 0.2 3,1 O (Wa) and (W,c). Neither are strict. O (W,c) and (Z,b). Both are strict O (Wc) and (Z,b). Neither are strict. O There are no Nash equilibria in this game.
2. Find all Nash equilibria (including MSNE) in the following game. Player 2 M Actions L R Player 1,3 2,-2 3,1 1,4 5,0 (Hint: first, show that some action is strictly dominated. Then, find all MSNE in the reduced game).
Find the Nash Equilibria of the following game Habtamu Left $4, $3 $6, $4 Right Up $7, $8 Dessie Down $3, $3
Determine ALL of the Nash equilibria
(pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria) of
the following 3 games:
Player 1 H T Player 2 HT (1, -1) (-1,1) | (-1,1) (1, -1) | Н Player 1 H D Player 2 D (2, 2) (3,1) | (3,1) |(2,2) | Player 2 A (2, 2) (0,0) Player 1 A B B (0,0) | (3,4)
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
Question 3 Consider the game in figure 3. Player 2 LR 3,3 1,4 Player 1 4,1 2,2 Figure 3: A Prisoner's Dilemma game. Assume that the payoffs in the figure are $ values. (i) Assume that both players have risk neutral utility functions. Find all of the Nash equilibria of this game. (ii) Next, assume that the row player has other regarding preferences with a = 0 and B = 3 (while the column player has the same preferences as...
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