Represent the following strategic interactions using payoff matrix/matrices:
Three players are playing the following game: Each of them will put a penny (1 cent in the US) down simultaneously, each choosing between head and tail. If players 1's and 2's penny are on the same side (i.e., both heads or both tails), then player 1 takes over player 2's penny. If player 1's and 2's penny are mismatched (i.e., one head, one tail), player 2 takes over player 1's penny. If player 3 chooses the head, she gets the same payoff as player 1. If player 3 chooses tail, she gets the same payoff as player 2. Everyone prefers having more pennies to fewer pennies.
Three players are playing the game.
If players 1's and 2's penny are on the same side (i.e., both heads or both tails), then player 1 takes over player 2's penny. (Let’s assume in this case Player-1 will get Payoff “1” )
If player 1's and 2's penny are mismatched (i.e., one head, one tail), player 2 takes over player 1's penny. (Let’s assume in this case Player-2 will get Payoff “1” )
If player 3 chooses the head, she gets the same payoff as player 1. If player 3 chooses tail, she gets the same payoff as player 2. (Here the payoff obtained by the player-3 would be as per the question )
Represent the following strategic interactions using payoff matrix/matrices: Three players are playing the following game: Each...
please answer part c thanks! 2) Imagine a two-player game where individuals in the population are paired at random. There are two possible strategies: heads and tails. If both players play heads or both players play tails, then nobody gets any payoff. However, if a head is paired against a tail, then the head receives 4 units of payoff and the tail receives 6. In other words, we have the following payoff matrix: Heads Tails Heads 10,0 6,4 Tails 4,6...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of matching pennies as described above. If the pennies match player 2 pays player 1 $1 (both get head or tail). If the pennies are not matched player 1 pays player 2 $1 ( head , tail or tail , head). H represents heads and T represents Tails 1. (2 points) What is the set of strategies for each player? 2. (5 points) Is there...
The following payoff matrix depicts the possible outcomes for two players involved in a game of volleyball. At this point in the game, the ball has just been hit to Deidra, and she chooses whether to hit right or hit left. At the same time, Ashley chooses whether to jump right (Deidra’s right) or jump left (Deidra’s left). If a player receives a payoff of 1, the player wins the point; if the player receives a payoff of –1, the...
2) Here's another game: There are three players, numbered 1,2, and 3. At the beginning of the game, players1 and 2 simultaneously make decisions, each pulling out a Red or Blue marble. Neither player can see what the other player is choosing. After this choice, the players secretly reveal their marbles to each other without letting player 3 see. If both players choose Red, then the game ends and the payoff vector is(, 0, 0). If both players choose Blue,...
Consider a game between a police officer (player 3) and two drivers (players 1 and 2). Player 1 lives and drives in Wynwood, whereas player 2 lives and drives in Sweetwater. On a given day, players 1 and 2 each have to decide whether or not to use their cell phones while driving. They are not friends, so they will not be calling each other. Thus, whether player 1 uses a cell phone is independent of whether player 2 uses...
Billy and Cam are playing the following game: each player has a coin and decides whether to leave it as heads or tails before showdown (both player reveals their coin simultaneously). If both coins are heads, Billy wins $2. If both are tails, Billy wins $0.50. Otherwise, Cam wins $1. Find the optimal strategy for Billy.
Compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game. There are two people who simultaneously select numbers between zero and one. Suppose player 1 chooses s1 and player 2 chooses s2 . If si < sj , then player i gets a payoff of (si + sj )>2 and player j obtains 1 − (si + sj )>2, for i = 1, 2. If s1 = s2 , then both players get a payoff of 1>2. Please make sure to...
Game Theory: Will rate for correct and descriptive answers! 2) Here's another game: There are three players, numbered 1,2, and 3. At the beginning of the game, players1 and 2 simultaneously make decisions, each pulling out a Red or Blue marble. Neither player can see what the other player is choosing. After this choice, the players secretly reveal their marbles to each other without letting player 3 see. If both players choose Red, then the game ends and the payoff...
Two players are playing a game in which each player requests an amount of money, simultaneously. The amount must be an integer between 11 and 20, inclusive. Each player will receive the amount she requests in $s. A player will receive an additional amount of $20 if she asks an amount that is exactly 1 less than the other player’s amount. All of the above is common knowledge. a) Find the set of all pure-strategy Nash Equilibria. b) Suppose we...