For each of the following games, we are going to do the following:
a. Write what each player’s best response and strictly dominant strategies (if these exist)
b. Identify the Nash Equilibrium/Nash equilibria
c. Sketch the points on a relevant axes
d. Label the points you think are Pareto Efficient and explain why you think they are Pareto Efficient
Mariam Cooperate | Maiam Not Cooperate | |
Amanda Cooperate | (2,2) | (3,3) |
Amanda Not Cooperate | (1,1) | (4,4) |
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For each of the following games, we are going to do the following: a. Write what...
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