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Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4) si multaneously and independently selects her contribution s E [0, 10]. Each player gets a benefit related to all of the players choices of s,s, but incurs a cost related to her own contribution s In particular, the payoff to each player i is given by: ul (s1 , s2, s3, s.) = si + s2 + s3 + 84-0.5s (a) Find best response functions for all players. (b) Find all Nash equilibria (if any). (c) Are there any dominated strategies? (d) Are there any dominant strategies?

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Pat밖 fin playas るs P. っ! ヒーSL SL ermee 1b) Tees ual best ae nasa e Nash e 3 OK

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