Consider an investment game among 2 players. Each player can either invest, i, or not invest,-i....
Consider an investment game among 2 players. Each player can either invest,
i, or not invest,-i. If a player does not invest, her payoff is 0 regardless of
whether the other invests or not. If a player invests, she gets 1 if the other invests but -1 if at least one of the others does not.
a. What are the pure Nash equilibria?
b. What is the Pareto dominant pure Nash equilibrium?
c. What is the Risk dominant pure Nash equilibrium? Is it the same as the
Pareto Dominant Nash equilibrium you found in b.?
Homework Answers
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Consider an investment game among 2 players. Each player can
either invest,
i, or not invest,-i....
Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4)...
Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4) si multaneously and independently selects her contribution s E [0, 10]. Each player gets a benefit related to all of the players choices of s,'s, but incurs a cost related to her own contribution s In particular, the payoff to each player i is given by: ul (s1 , s2, s3, s.) = si + s2 + s3 + 84-0.5s (a) Find best response...
13. Consider the following n-player game. Simultaneously and independently, the players each select either X, Y,...
13. Consider the following n-player game. Simultaneously and independently, the players each select either X, Y, or Z. The payoffs are defined as follows. Each player who selects X obtains a payoff equal to y, where y is the num- ber of players who select Z. Each player who selects Y obtains a payoff of 2a, where a is the number of players who select X. Each player who selects Z obtains a payoff of 3B, where ß is the...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The tab...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Consider a game between a police officer (player 3) and two drivers (players 1 and 2)....
Consider a game between a police officer (player 3) and two drivers (players 1 and 2). Player 1 lives and drives in Wynwood, whereas player 2 lives and drives in Sweetwater. On a given day, players 1 and 2 each have to decide whether or not to use their cell phones while driving. They are not friends, so they will not be calling each other. Thus, whether player 1 uses a cell phone is independent of whether player 2 uses...
GAME MATRIX Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (...
GAME MATRIX
Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider two players (Rose as player...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....
Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each player is a manager who wishes to get a...
Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each
player is a manager who wishes to get a promotion. To get the
promotion, each player has two possible strategies: earn it through
hard work (Work) or make the other person look bad through
unscrupulous means (Nasty). The payoff matrix describing this game
is shown below. The payoffs for each player are levels of
utility—larger numbers are preferred to smaller numbers. Player 1’s
payoffs are listed first in each box.
Find the Nash...
Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each player is a manager who wishes to get a...
Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each
player is a manager who wishes to get a promotion. To get the
promotion, each player has two possible strategies: earn it through
hard work (Work) or make the other person look bad through
unscrupulous means (Nasty). The payoff matrix describing this game
is shown below. The payoffs for each player are levels of
utility—larger numbers are preferred to smaller numbers. Player 1’s
payoffs are listed first in each box.Find the Nash
equilibrium...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR! Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player A can...
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR!
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player
A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either
Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table where
the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on
the right is the payoff to Player B.
Does Player A have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Group of answer choices
Top is...
Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4) si multaneously and independently selects her contribution s E [0, 10]. Each player gets a benefit related to all of the players choices of s,'s, but incurs a cost related to her own contribution s In particular, the payoff to each player i is given by: ul (s1 , s2, s3, s.) = si + s2 + s3 + 84-0.5s (a) Find best response...
13. Consider the following n-player game. Simultaneously and independently, the players each select either X, Y, or Z. The payoffs are defined as follows. Each player who selects X obtains a payoff equal to y, where y is the num- ber of players who select Z. Each player who selects Y obtains a payoff of 2a, where a is the number of players who select X. Each player who selects Z obtains a payoff of 3B, where ß is the...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
GAME MATRIX
Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider two players (Rose as player...
Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each
player is a manager who wishes to get a promotion. To get the
promotion, each player has two possible strategies: earn it through
hard work (Work) or make the other person look bad through
unscrupulous means (Nasty). The payoff matrix describing this game
is shown below. The payoffs for each player are levels of
utility—larger numbers are preferred to smaller numbers. Player 1’s
payoffs are listed first in each box.
Find the Nash...
Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each
player is a manager who wishes to get a promotion. To get the
promotion, each player has two possible strategies: earn it through
hard work (Work) or make the other person look bad through
unscrupulous means (Nasty). The payoff matrix describing this game
is shown below. The payoffs for each player are levels of
utility—larger numbers are preferred to smaller numbers. Player 1’s
payoffs are listed first in each box.Find the Nash
equilibrium...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR!
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player
A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either
Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table where
the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on
the right is the payoff to Player B.
Does Player A have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Group of answer choices
Top is...
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