NEED WITHIN THE HOUR!
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B.
Does Player A have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Group of answer choices
Top is a dominant strategy for Player A
Bottom is a dominant strategy for Player A
Both of the above
None of the above
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Question 41 pts
Does Player B have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Group of answer choices
Left is a dominant strategy for Player B
Right is a dominant strategy for Player B
Both of the above
None of the above
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Question 51 pts
For the next four questions, you’ll be asked whether a strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium or not. Player A plays Top and Player B plays Left
Group of answer choices
This is a Nash equilibrium
This is NOT a Nash equilibrium
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Question 61 pts
Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Left
Group of answer choices
This is a Nash equilibrium
This is NOT a Nash equilibrium
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Question 71 pts
Player A plays Top and Player B plays Right
Group of answer choices
This is a Nash equilibrium
This is NOT a Nash equilibrium
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Question 81 pts
Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Right
Group of answer choices
This is a Nash equilibrium
This is NOT a Nash equilibrium
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Question 92 pts
If each player plays her maximin strategy, what will be the outcome of the game?
Group of answer choices
Player A plays Top and Player B plays Left
Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Left
Player A plays Top and Player B plays Right
Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Right
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Question 102 pts
Now suppose the same game is played with the exception that Player A moves first and Player B moves second. Using the backward induction method discussed in the online class notes, what will be the outcome of the game?
Group of answer choices
Player A plays Top and Player B plays Left
Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Left
Player A plays Top and Player B plays Right
Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Right
Payoff matrix
A/B | left | right |
Top | (5*,5) | (7*,6•) |
Bottom | (3,4•) | (6,2) |
Q1) option A)
player A has dominant strategy : Top
Bcoz A always gets higher payoff from A, for any choice of B
.
Q41) option D) none of the above
B doesn't have any Dominant strategy
.
Q51) option B) its not NE
NE: ( Top , right)
A plays Top, B plays right
.
Q61) option B)
Not a NE
.
Q71) option A)
Its a NE
.
Q81) option B)
not a NE
.
Q92) option A)
A plays Top, B plays left
A/B | left | right | max | min |
Top | (5,5) | (7,6) | 6 | |
Bottom | (3,4) | (6,2) | 4 | Min (left for B) |
Max (for A) | 5 | 7 | ||
Min | min ( Top for A) |
Q102) option C)
SPNE : ( top, right)
A plays top
B plays right
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR! Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player A can...
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either top or bottom, and Player 2 can choose either left of right. The payoffs are given in the following table Player 2 Left Right top 9,4 2,3 Player 1 Bottom 1,0 3,1 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1 and the number on the right is the payoff to player 2. 1) Determine the nash equilibrium of the game. 2) If...
30 units. 5. Two players are playing a game. There are two options for player 1. Top or Bottom, and two options for player 2, Left or Right. The payoff matrix is as below. What is the pure Nash equilibrium in this case (Top, Left) b. (Top, Right) (Bottom, Top) a. c. d. (Bottom, Right) No pure Nash equilibrium. e. Left Right Top 5,5 0,4 Bottom 4,0 -1,-1
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1. (20 points) Consider the following game: Left 7,17 10,5 4,4 Top Middle Bottom Player B Middle 21,21 14,4 7,3 Right 14,11 4,3 10,25 Player A a. Does either player have a dominant strategy? What about a dominated strategy? b. What are the Nash equilibria of this game? C. Is there one Nash equilibrium that you think is a more likely outcome than the others? If so, why? If not, why not? d. Now suppose the game looks like this:...
A game involving two players with two possible strategies is a prisoner's dilemma if each player has a dominant strategy and: Select one: a. neither player plays their dominant strategy. b. each player's payoff is higher when both play their dominated strategy than when both play their dominant strategy. c. each player's payoff is lower when both play their dominant strategy than when both play their dominated strategy. d. there is a Nash equilibrium that yields the highest payoff for...
. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: Player 2 Left Middle Right Player 1 Top 4, 3 0, 0 1, 4 Bottom 0, 0 2, 1 0, 0 There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of the stage game. (a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Larry and Megan are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Lamy chooses Right and Megan chooses Right, Larry will receive a payoff of 7 and Megan will receive a payoff of 6.The only dominant strategy...
Check my work In a two-player, one-shot simultaneous-move game each player can choose strategy A or strategy B. If both players choose strategy A, each earns a choose strategy B, each earns a payoff of $200. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns $100 and player 2 earns $600. If player 1 chooses strategy Band player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns $600 and player 2 earns $100. payoff...
Suppose Shen and Valerie are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Shen chooses Right and Valerie chooses Right, Shen will receive a payoff of 3 and Valerie will receive a payoff of 7. The only dominant strategy in this game is for _______ to choose...