Suppose that two players are playing the following game
Player 2
Left Right
top 9,4 2,3
Player 1
Bottom 1,0 3,1
where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1 and the number on the right is the payoff to player 2.
1) Determine the nash equilibrium of the game.
2) If each player plays their maximin strategy, what payoff will each of them receive?
Each player I think does not have a dominant strategy.
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