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07. Consider the following game table: COLIN Left Center Right Top 4 3,5 ,2 2 3,1 2,3 ROWENA Middle Bottom ---,3 3,4 4,2
130 [CH. 4) SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Complete the payoffs of the game table above so that Colin has a
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Answer #1

(a)

Colin: Left Center Right
Rowena: Top 4, 1 2,2 3,1
Middle 3,5 2,6 2,3
Bottom 1,3 3,4 4,2

Given that Rowena choose Top, Colin's best response is Center (2).
Given that Rowena choose Middle, Colin's best response is Center (6).
Given that Rowena choose Bottom, Colin's best response is Center (4).
So, 'Center' is the dominant strategy for Colin because it always gives him higher payoff irrespective of Rowena's strategy.

(b)

Colin: Left Center Right
Rowena: Top 4, 5 4,2 3,1
Middle 3,5 2,4 2,3
Bottom 4,3 3,4 4,2

Given that Rowena choose Top, Colin's best response is Left (5).
Given that Rowena choose Middle, Colin's best response is Left (5).
Given that Rowena choose Bottom, Colin's best response is Center (4).
So, Colin does not have any dominant strategy because there is no strategy which is always his best response. His dominated strategy is right because it is never chosen by Colin.

Given that Colin choose Left, Rowena's best response is Top and bottom (4).
Given that Colin choose Middle, Rowena's best response is Top (4).
Given that Colin choose Right, Rowena's best response is Bottom (4).
So, Rowena does not have any dominant strategy because there is no strategy which is always his best response. Her dominated strategy is center because it is never chosen by Rowena.

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