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Problem 3 Consider two quantity-setting firms that produce a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function for the good is p = A-(qitqd. Each firm i has a cost function C (a) what is the Nash eajuilibrium if both firms choose their Чuantities simultaneously? What are the equilibrium profits of the two firms? (b) Suppose that firm 1 can switch to a new technology under which its cost function becomes Ci F + g2/2. The cost function of firm 2 remains C-g2. What the largest value of F for which firm 1 will switch to the new technology if it assumes that both firms will continue to produce the same equilibrium quantities that vou computed in (a)? (Hint: you should evaluate the profit of firm 1 after the switch at the equilibrium quantities that you computed in (a)) (c) Are the equilibrium quantities that you computed in (a) still optimal for both firms after firm 1 adopts the new technology? Explain your answer and show why or why not this is true. (Hint: you should compute the best response of each firm after firm 1 makes the switch to the new technology and then check if its quantity in (a) is a best response against the rivals quantity in (a)). (d) Compute the Nash equilibrium after firm 1 adopts the new technology (note that this equilibrium is not symmetric) (e) What is the largest value of F for which firm 1 will switch to the new technology? (Hint: you should compare the profits of firm 1 in (a) andi (f) Compare your answers to (b) and (e). Explain the intuition in detail; that is. why is/isnt there a difference between the two answers?

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