Games theory : Inside Oligopoly
Use the following normal-form game to answer the following questions.
a. Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
b. Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.
c. Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 6 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.
d. Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is θ. If θ is sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one-shot Nash equilibrium?
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GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash equilibrium Suppose a stage game has...
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash
equilibrium
Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T...
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Games theory : Inside Oligopoly
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Games theory : Inside Oligopoly
Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1’s actual move and then decides to move right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives $0 and player 2 receives $25. If both players move left, player 1 receives –$5 and player 2 receives $10. If player 1 moves left and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives $20 and player 2 receives...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE...
True or False: Please explain why this is true or false so I can understand. Just...
True or False: Please explain why this is true or false so I
can understand. Just part b. Thank you
taneous move stage game, then there cannot be an SPNE of the infinitely repeated game in which player i plays D every period (b) In any Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game, the players play one of the stage game Nash equilibria in every period.
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently....
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Consider the following normal form game: U D LR 7,7 4,8 8,4 5,5 a. Are there...
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Refers to gametheory strategy 4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was...
Refers to gametheory strategy
4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellog and its rival to advertise...
GAME THEORY: Suppose a stage game has exactly one nash
equilibrium
Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible. b In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods. C.The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In a finitely repeated game where T...
QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE...
True or False: Please explain why this is true or false so I
can understand. Just part b. Thank you
taneous move stage game, then there cannot be an SPNE of the infinitely repeated game in which player i plays D every period (b) In any Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game, the players play one of the stage game Nash equilibria in every period.
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
Consider the following normal form game: U D LR 7,7 4,8 8,4 5,5 a. Are there dominant actions for any of the players? b. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. c. Suppose we repeat this game 10 times, specify a subgame perfect equi- librium of this finitely repeated game. d. Suppose this game is repeated infinitely: Identify a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game which gives an average (normalized) dis- counted payoff of 7 to both players. Clearly identify...
4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellog and its rival to advertise or "don't advertise" is...
Refers to gametheory strategy
4. (10 points) At cereal a time maker when Kellogg's demand was for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, “.....for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. The payoff matrix for Kellog and its rival to advertise...
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