Question

n an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (such as a repeated price war): Group of answer choices...

n an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (such as a repeated price war):

Group of answer choices

repeated defection is the only equilibrium.

there are two different equilibria: repeated defection and repeated cooperation.

repeated cooperation is the only equilibrium.

each player cooperates in the early stages, but defects near the end of the game.

there is no stable equilibrium strategy for either player.

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Answer #1

In an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (such as a repeated price war):-

-there are two different equilibria: repeated defection and repeated cooperation

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