Remove any dominated strategies from the payoff matrix below. Find the optimum strategies for player A...
Find the optimum strategies for player A and player in the game represented by the following payoff matrix. Find the value of the game. What is the optimum strategy for player A? Choose the correct answer below, and fill in the answer box(es) to complete your choice. (Type integers or simplified fractions.) O A. The game is strictly determined. Player A should choose row and row 2 with probability O B . The game is not strictly determined. Player A...
Find the optimum strategies for player A, the row player, and player B, the column player, in the game below. Find the value of the game. (Be sure to look for a saddle point first.) -7 0 5 -5 Choose the correct answer below,and fill in the answer box(es) to complete your choice. Simplify your answers. Type integers or fractions.) OA. There is no saddle point, and the optimal strategy for player A is P1. O B. The game is...
Fill in the payoff matrix. Same e there is t thore is no match B wins the amount of dollars equal to the number of fingers shown. Players A andpay agae equal to the total number a match, A wins the amount of dollars fingers shown ere (a) Write the payoff matrix. 9F 10F and B and the value of the game. (b) Find the optimum strategies for A 9F 10F $ What is the optimum strategy for player A?...
The payoff matrix for a game is 3 -5 2 (a) Find the expected payoff to the row player if the row player R uses the maximin pure strategy and the column C player uses the minimax pure strategy (b Find the expected payoff to the row player if R uses the maximin strategy 40% of the time and chooses each of the other two rows 30% of the bme while C uses the miin ax strategy 50% of the...
Find the optimum strategies for player A and player B in the game represented by the following payoff matrix. Find the value of the game. -3 1/5 0 -2
The payoff matrix for a game ls 5 -1 4 -4 21 2-5 2 (a) Find the expected payoff to the row player If the row player R uses the maximin pure strategy and the column C player uses the minlmax pure strategy (b) Find the expected payoff to the row player if R uses the maximin strategy 40% of the time and chooses each of the other two rows 30% of the time while C uses the minimax strategy...
Iterated Iterated elimination of dominated strategies: Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the original game. Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the modified game where players cannot choose any strategy that was eliminated at Step 1. 3 Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the modified game where players cannot choose any strategy that was eliminated at Steps 1 and 2. 4 ... and so on until there are...
(a) (5 points) Do the players have any strategies which are dominated? Any dominant strategies? (b) (2 points) Suppose you could create a new strategy (D) which consisted of A x = 75% of the time and C 1 − x = 25% of the time. If your payoff from this new strategy is the average of your payoffs from A and C (given the percentages), what is the payoff of D? Add it to the matrix. (c) (3 points)...
The following matrix gives the payoff for Player 1 and Player 2 with R and L strategies. Assume that they determine their strategies simultaneously and independently. Player 2 R L R (5, 4) (-1, -1) Player 1 L (-1, -1) (2, 2) (a) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy? Why or why not? What is its dominant strategy, if existing? (b) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy? Why or why not? What is its dominant strategy, if existing?...
2. (5 marks total IEDS practice Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the following games. We will call the row player P1 and the column player P2; note that for each entry in the payoff matrices below, PI's payoff is listed first. Clearly indicate: the order in which you eliminate strategies; whether the eliminated strategy is strictly or weakly dominated; If you find a dominant strategy equilibrium, state what it is. Is it unique? 81 (1,5) 50, -11)...