Question

2. (5 marks total IEDS practice Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the following games. We will call the row player P1 and the column player P2; note that for each entry in the payoff matrices below, PI's payoff is listed first. Clearly indicate: the order in which you eliminate strategies; whether the eliminated strategy is strictly or weakly dominated; If you find a dominant strategy equilibrium, state what it is. Is it unique? 81 (1,5) 50, -11) (8, 6) (26, 4) s3-1,11) ,) 2, 15, 10) for cach strategy that you eliminate, state which remaining strategy dominates it; ts (a) (2 marks) 24, 12,-2) 5,3) (25,0) 4 (3,13) 7, (4.-8) -11,10) #2 ts ts (b) (3 marks)2,2 (2,3) (-1,0) (2.5) 4 1, (3,0) , (-1,4)

Answer 1

2)

a) In the payoff matrix, There is dominant strategy equilibrium. It is (1, 5), that is when player P1 chooses to play up and player P2 chooses right, This is player 1's dominant strategy because this strategy gives player 1 highest possible pay off. It is unique.

b) In the payoff matrix, There is a dominant strategy equilibrium, It is (1, 1), that is when player P1 chooses to play up and player P2 chooses right, This is player P1's dominant strategy because this strategy gives player P1 highest possible pay off. It is not unique.