) Solve the game below by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (Hint: One of the pure strategies for player 1 is strongly dominated by a mixed strategy). At each step of the elimination, state which pure strategy you are eliminating and which strategy (there can be more than one; just state one) it is strongly dominated by. X Y Z A 5,-2 0,1 6,0 B 2,8 2,3 1,4 C 0,0 7,1 -2,0
Let's draw the Payoff table and then solve the problem -
) Solve the game below by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (Hint: One of the...
survive 1.2. In the following normal-form game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria? of strictly dominated L CR T 2,0 1,14,2 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 B 1,30,2 3,0
Iterated Iterated elimination of dominated strategies: Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the original game. Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the modified game where players cannot choose any strategy that was eliminated at Step 1. 3 Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all players in the modified game where players cannot choose any strategy that was eliminated at Steps 1 and 2. 4 ... and so on until there are...
2. (5 marks total IEDS practice Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the following games. We will call the row player P1 and the column player P2; note that for each entry in the payoff matrices below, PI's payoff is listed first. Clearly indicate: the order in which you eliminate strategies; whether the eliminated strategy is strictly or weakly dominated; If you find a dominant strategy equilibrium, state what it is. Is it unique? 81 (1,5) 50, -11)...
Game Theory Iterated Elimination: In the following normal-form game, which strategy profiles survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? 4.5 Player 2 L C R 6,8 2,6 8,2 Player 1 M 8,2 4,4 9,5 D 8,10 4,6 6,7
Q1 Elimination of strictly-dominated strategies In each of the following two-player games, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly- dominated strategies? Player 2 Lett Center Right Top 0.2 4, 3 3,1 Player1 Middle 1, 2 2,0 2, Bottom 2,4 36 0,3 Player 2 Left Center Right Top 1, 3 ,4 ,2 Player 1 Middle 2,2 2 3,1 Bottom 3, 5 43 1, 4
1. (Dominated Strategies) Find strictly dominant strategy, strictly dominated strategy, weakly dominant strategy, and weakly dominated strategy of the following two games("None" may be an answer). Do not forget to discuss about mixed strategies too. (a) (Keio and Waseda) Player 2 K E O Wa 6,1 2,3 0,2 Player 1 Se 3,00,0,0 Da 2,0 1,2 01 b) (NHK BS) Player 2 BS N 41 0,2 Player 1 H 0,0 4,0 Problems 6 and 7 are in the next pages
For each of the following normal-form game below, find the rationalizable strategy profiles, using IENBRS, Iterated Elimination of Never a Best Response Strategies. (1)/(2) L C R (3,2) (4,0) (1,1) (2,0) (3,3) (0,0) (1,1) (0,2) (2,3)
a) Eliminate strictly dominated strategies.b) If the game does not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the smaller game(after eliminating dominated strategies). Player 2Player 1abcA4,33,22,4B1,35,33,3
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For each one, identify which strategies are non-rationalizable (if any), and which strategies are strictly dominated (if any). Do this for both players in each game. Note: You don't need to use IESDS or IENBR in this problem: I only want to know which strategies are strictly dominated or non-rationalizable in the games as presented. Rogers Go Rogue Go Legit 2,3 3,4 3,2 5,1 3,1...
7. Consider the following two player game, with the players being 1 and 2. As usual 1 chooses a row and 2 a column. ABC a 1,4 2,1 3,2 4,1 b 2,3 3,4 4,3 1,2 с 3,1 4,2 1,4 2,3 d 4,2 1,3 4,3 3,2 (a) Which strategies satisfy iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? How many levels of knowledge of rationality do you have to assume to obtain your result? (b) If you were allowed to follow the same...