Question

Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC 478 U.S. 421 (1986) The union and its apprenticeship committee were found guilty of discrimination against Hispanics and African-Americans and were ordered to remedy the violations. They were found numerous times to be in contempt of the court’s order, and after 18 years the court eventually imposed fines and an affirmative action plan as a remedy. The plan included benefits to persons not members of the union. The Supreme Court held the remedies to be appropriate under the circumstances. Brennan, J. *** Local 28 represents sheet metal workers employed by contractors in the New York City metropolitan area. The Local 28 Joint Apprenticeship Committee (JAC) is a labor–management committee which operates a 4-year apprenticeship training program designed to teach sheet metal skills. Apprentices enrolled in the program receive training both from classes and from on-the-job work experience. Upon completing the program, apprentices become journeyman members of Local 28. Successful completion of the program is the principal means of attaining union membership. In 1964, the New York State Commission for Human Rights determined that the union and JAC had excluded African-Americans from the union and apprenticeship program in violation of state law. The Commission, among other things, found that the union had never had any black members or apprentices, and that “admission to apprenticeship is conducted largely on a nepot[is]tic basis involving sponsorship by incumbent union members,” creating an impenetrable barrier for nonwhite applicants. The union and JAC were ordered to “cease and desist” their racially discriminatory practices. Over the next 18 years and innumerable trips to court, the union did not remedy the discrimination. To remedy the contempt and the union’s refusal to comply with court orders, the court imposed a 29 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by a certain date, and a $150,000 fine to be placed in a fund designed to increase nonwhite membership in the apprenticeship program and the union. The fund was used for a variety of purposes, including: Providing counseling and tutorial services to nonwhite apprentices, giving them benefits that had traditionally been available to white apprentices from family and friends. Providing financial support to employers otherwise unable to hire a sufficient number of apprentices. Providing matching funds to attract additional funding for job-training programs. Creating part-time and summer sheet metal jobs for qualified nonwhite youths. Extending financial assistance to needy apprentices. Paying for nonwhite union members to serve as liaisons to vocational and technical schools with sheet metal programs in order to increase the pool of qualified nonwhite applicants for the apprenticeship program. The union appealed the remedy. Principally, the parties maintain that the Fund and goal exceeds the scope of remedies available under Title VII because it extends race-conscious preferences to individuals who are not the identified victims of their unlawful discrimination. They argue that section 706(g) authorizes a district court to award preferential relief only to actual victims of unlawful discrimination. They maintain that the goal and Fund violates this provision since it requires them to extend benefits to black and Hispanic individuals who are not the identified victims of unlawful discrimination. We reject this argument and hold that section 706(g) does not prohibit a court from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Specifically, we hold that such relief may be appropriate where an employer or a labor union has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination. The availability of race-conscious affirmative relief under section 706(g) as a remedy for a violation of Title VII furthers the broad purposes underlying the statute. page 268Congress enacted Title VII based on its determination that racial minorities were subject to pervasive and systematic discrimination in employment. It was clear to Congress that the crux of the problem was “to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them and it was to this problem that Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination was primarily addressed.” Title VII was designed to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. In order to foster equal employment opportunities, Congress gave the lower courts broad power under section 706(g) to fashion the most complete relief possible to remedy past discrimination. In most cases, the court need only order the employer or union to cease engaging in discriminatory practices, and award make-whole relief to the individuals victimized by those practices. In some instances, however, it may be necessary to require the employer or union to take affirmative steps to end discrimination effectively to enforce Title VII. Where an employer or union has engaged in particularly longstanding or egregious discrimination, an injunction simply reiterating Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination will often prove useless and will only result in endless enforcement litigation. In such cases, requiring a recalcitrant employer or unions to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities in the workforce may be the only effective way to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights protected by Title VII. Further, even where the employer or union formally ceases to engage in discrimination, informal mechanisms may obstruct equal employment opportunities. An employer’s reputation for discrimination may discourage minorities from seeking available employment. In these circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief may be the only means available to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens. Affirmative action promptly operates to change the outward and visible signs of yesterday’s racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices. Finally, a district court may find it necessary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending the development of non-discriminatory hiring or promotion procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals provides a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: an outright ban on hiring or promotions, or continued use of a discriminatory selection procedure. We have previously suggested that courts may utilize certain kinds of racial preferences to remedy past discrimination under Title VII. The Courts of Appeals have unanimously agreed that racial preferences may be used, in appropriate cases, to remedy past discrimination under Title VII. The extensive legislative history of the Act supports this view. Many opponents of Title VII argued that an employer could be found guilty of discrimination under the statute simply because of a racial imbalance in his workforce, and would be compelled to implement racial “quotas” to avoid being charged with liability. At the same time, supporters of the bill insisted that employers would not violate Title VII simply because of racial imbalance, and emphasized that neither the EEOC nor the courts could compel employers to adopt quotas solely to facilitate racial balancing. The debate concerning what Title VII did and did not require culminated in the adoption of section 703(j), which stated expressly that the statute did not require an employer or labor union to adopt quotas or preferences simply because of a racial imbalance. Although we conclude that section 706(g) does not foreclose a court from instituting some sort of racial preferences where necessary to remedy past discrimination, we do not mean to suggest such relief is always proper. The court should exercise its discretion with an eye towards Congress’ concern that the measures not be invoked simply to create a racially balanced workforce. In the majority of cases the court will not have to impose affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimination, but need only order the employer or union to cease engaging in discriminatory practices. However, in some cases, affirmative action may be necessary in order effectively to enforce Title VII, such as with persistent or egregious discrimination or to dissipate the effects of pervasive discrimination. The court should also take care to tailor its orders to fit the nature of the violation it seeks to correct. Here, the membership goal and Fund were necessary to remedy the union and JAC’s pervasive and egregious discrimination and its lingering effects. The goal was flexible and thus gives a strong indication that it was not being used simply to achieve and maintain racial balance, but rather as a benchmark against which the court could gauge the union’s efforts. Twice the court adjusted the deadline for the goal and has continually approved changes in the size of apprenticeship classes to account for economic conditions preventing the union from meeting its targets. And it is temporary in that it will end as soon as the percentage of minority union members approximates the percentage page 269of minorities in the local labor force. Similarly the fund is scheduled to terminate when the union achieves its membership goal and the court determines it is no longer needed to remedy past discrimination. Also, neither the goal nor the fund unnecessarily trammels the interests of white employees. They do not require any union members to be laid off, and do not discriminate against existing union members. While whites seeking admission into the union may be denied benefits extended to nonwhite counterparts, the court’s orders do not stand as an absolute bar to such individuals; indeed a majority of new union members have been white. Many of the provisions of the orders are race-neutral (such as the requirement that the JAC assign one apprenticeship for every four journeymen workers) and the union and JAC remain free to adopt the provisions of the order for the benefit of white members and applicants.Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

Facts [Summarize only those facts critical to the outcome of the case]

Issue [Note the central question or questions on which the case turns]

Explain the applicable law(s). Use the textbook here. The law should come from the same chapter as the case. Be sure to use citations from the textbook including page numbers.

Holding [How did the court resolve the issue(s)? Who won?]

Reasoning [ [Explain the logic that supported the court's decision]

Questions

1)Is it clear to you why a court would be able to include in its remedies those who are not directly discriminated against by an employer?Explain.

2) If you were the court and were still trying to get the union to comply with your order 18 years after the fact, what would you have done?

3)As an employer, how could you avoid such a result?

Answer 1

1)Is it clear to you why a court would be able to include in its remedies those who are not directly discriminated against by an employer?Explain.

The court has introduced a number of laws to eliminate activities such as discrimination against employees. In this situation, company L seems to be biased against the black people in receiving the training program. The court insisted initially on reforming behaviors and, if they did not respond, ordered the black people to pay their fines and set certain deadlines. In certain cases such people are kept separate from such institutions, so that the ill effects of prejudice are not felt. The court may also include these individuals even if the organisations do not discriminate explicitly. In compliance with the law, the government uses the money collected to educate and establish discrimination groups.

2) If you were the court and were still trying to get the union to comply with your order 18 years after the fact, what would you have done?

For the last 10 years organization L has not answered the court order for discrimination against the black people in this way. This is a grave violation of the court's disrespect. For the same reason, the court may even prosecute it. Every way to enforce fair and rational is also a successful court order.

3)As an employer, how could you avoid such a result?

The equity policy introduced by the government and other laws should be practiced by each and every employer. This is for the good of both the individuals and the organisations. Employers should ensure that their employees or applicants are not discriminated against and provide equal opportunity to prevent this.

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