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In a Cournot market structure with two firms, firm A's reaction function gives: optimal quantity for...

In a Cournot market structure with two firms, firm A's reaction function gives:
optimal quantity for A as a function of price for A and price for B.
optimal price for A as a function of price for B.
optimal quantity for A as a function of price for B.
optimal quantity for A as a function of quantity for B.

*option 1 is incorrect

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Answer #1

optimal quantity for A as a function of quantity for B.

(In Cournot market structure, both firms determine their output simultaneously so reaction function of a firm expresses its optimal quantity as a function of other firm's quantity.)

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