Consider a market with two firms. Suppose that that firm 2 that invests in a new...
Suppose that that firm 2 that invests in a new technology that changes it cost structure from firm 1. Market demand is Q = 18 – P, firm 1 faces costs C(Q.) = {, and now firm 2 has costs, Cz(Qz) = Q2. Consider a Cournot model. a. What is firm 1's best response function? b. Set up firm 2's profit maximization and solve for firm 2's best response function. Find the equilibrium quantity for firm 1, firm 2, the...
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q = 18 – P with the cost (c(Q) =*Q). a. Set up firm l's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm l's best response function. c. Solve for firm l's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. Suppose that that firm 2 that invests in a new technology that changes it cost structure from firm 1. Market demand is still Q = 18 – P, firm 1 still faces costs 1 f(0) == Q}, and now firm 2 has costs, C3(Qx) = 23. Consider a Cournot model again. a. What is firm 1's best response function? b. Set up...
Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q=18-P) with the same cost (C(Q)=1/2 *Q^2). Set up firm 1’s profit maximization. Solve for firm 1’s best response function. Solve for firm 1’s quantity, firm 2’s quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. Is this a Nash equilibrium? Do consumers prefer the Cournot competition equilibrium over the collusion of the two firms...
Suppose we have two firms with the same cost C(q) = {Q2 in a market which demand is Q 18 – P, the two firms compete in the Cournot Model. a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization and best response function. b. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Please show your work. c. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium? e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot...
PROBLEM #1 Consider a market with two firms that sell products that are identical. Su market demand is as follows: P-56-Q , where Q measures the total output produced by both firms (that is, Q=q +q.) and qi and q, are the quantities produced by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. The per-unit cost of production is $6 for each firm, and so the firm's cost functions are 6q, and 6q, respectively. Each firm seeks to maximize profits. The firms...
7. There are two firms that compete according to Cournot competition. Firm 1 has a cost function C1(91) = 2491 +5. Firm 2 has a cost function C(92) = 1022 +10. These firms cannot discriminate, so there is just one price that is determined by the aggregate demand. The inverse demand equation is P(Q) = 80 - Where total supply Q = 91 +92. (a) Setup the profit maximization problem for firm 1 with all necessary equations plugged in. (2...
Guided Notes Ant Jble #3: Cournot oligopoly (12 pts) consider a Cournot oligopoly in which the market demand curve is Q-60- P. There are 2 firms in this oligopoly, so this means Q-qi + q2. The firms in this market are not identical: Firm l's cost function is ei(q)= 2q , while Firm 2's cost function is cz(q:)-33q2. a) Write downa profit function for each firm. эрп b) Using your answer to a), find a best-response function for each firm....
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. (10 points) Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q 18 – P) with the same cost (C(q) = -23. 2 a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity,...