4. (25 points) Suppose there are only two firms producing widgets. The total cost function for ea...
Problem three Two firms in a homogencous-product duopoly market (firm 1 and firm 2) have the following cost and demand functions: TC 4 TC24q2 and Q-40-P: Q-+2 a Derive the reaction function/best-response function for each firm. b) Assume that the firms play a simultaneous move game. Characterize the Nash Equilibrium. cSuppose the two firms play game is a sequential game with the following timing of events: 1. Firm 1 chooses output 2. Firm 2 observes firm 1's output and then...
The answers I filled are wrong. 1 Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1 = 60Q1 and C2 = 60Q2, where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P= 900-Q where Q = Q1 +Q2: Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium....
Suppose 2 firms compete in a market for widgets. Each of them produces identical widgets. Each firm incurs a cost of $10 per widget produced. The two firms simultaneously (and independently) decide how many widgets to produce. The inverse demand for widgets is given by P=100−3Q, where Q=q1+q2, where q1denotes the output of firm 1 and q2 denotes the output of firm 2. What is firm 1's best response to q2=2? What is firm 1's best response to q2=20? What...
Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC(Q) 60Q Market Inverse Demand is: Pp (Q)824 0.6Q After the duopolists meet secretly and agree to evenly split the profit-maximizing output, Firm 1 decides to break the monopoly-splitting agreement and change its output to maximize its own profit. What will be the net loss of profit for the two firms to the nearest dollar? Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC(Q) 60Q Market Inverse Demand is: Pp (Q)824 0.6Q...
Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC (Q) 600 Market Inverse Demand is: Po (Q)-824 0.6Q After the duopolists meet secretly and agree to evenly split the profit-maximizing output, Firm 1 decides to break the monopoly-splitting agreement and change its output to maximize its own profit. What will be the reduction in price for both firms to the nearest dollar? (Subtract the new price from the monopoly price] Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC (Q)...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. (a) Assume a monopolist is operating in this market. (i) Calculate the quantity (qM) chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist. (ii) At the profit-maximizing quantity, what is the monopolistic market price (pM) of the product. (iii) Calculate the dead-weight loss (allocative inefficiency) associated with this monopoly market. Assume the market for this product is perfectly competitive. (i) Calculate the market-clearing output (qPC)...
1. (25 points) Consider two firms, 1 and 2, producing an identical good simul taneously. This good has market demand given by the demand function y (12 p)/3, where p is price, and y yi y2 is market quantity. yi represents the amount produced by firm i. Suppose production cost is 2yi1 for each firms (a) Solve algebraically for these firms' reaction functions, expressing each firm's optimal output level given the level of its competitor's out- put.(5 pts) (b) Graph...
2011 complete HW Score: 15 Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only forms in the market. Their costs are given by C, 600, and C determined by the following demand curve 600, who is the p p2100- where Q = 0, +Q2 Find the Coumot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium (For all of the following enter a numere response rounded to be decompos) When competing each firm will produce...
please answer all 10 questions thanks Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA = MCB = ACA = ACB = 25. The market demand function is given by Q = 400 – 4P. a. If the firms practice under the Bertrand model, what will be the Nash equilibrium market price and output level? b. If these two...
4. In the competit ve market for widgets there are 50 identical consumers and 200 iden tical firms. Each individual consumer has the following demand function for widgets P(P) 100 2P where qD is the quantity an individual consumes and P is the widget's price. Each firm has the following cost function: C() 100 2qq (a) (3 points) Find the market demand function for widgets QP(P). Find the industry supply function for widgets Qs(P), make sure to find each firm's...