Q2) Analyze the demand and cost functions in Question 1 using a Bertrand model of oligopoly where products are identical. Find the Nash equilbrium(a) prices. You can assume firms can charge prices in $0.01 increments. (Hint: You need to consider all cases and show why they are and are not Nash Equilibria. You may want to use the fact that if Firm 2 were a monopoly, it would charge $60.)
Done Answer 1 of 1 100-24-42..。 a0 o,'- 39に60 No-foto, 냐 -70 60 4 Jarh
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question 2 answer needed. Ql) Consider an oligopoly with 2 firms. The inverse demand curve is given by P- 100- Q1-Q2. Firm 1's total cost function is TC 30Q1. Firm 2's total cost...
Consider a Cournot game with 2 firms. Inverse demand function is given by P = 20...
Consider a Cournot game with 2 firms. Inverse demand function is given by P = 20 - (91 +92). The firm has MC=AC=5. Firms choose qi e 0,00) a) Find the Nash equilibrium (9:47). Calculate profits in equilibrium. b) Now suppose that a firm also has to pay a fixed cost of 20 if it produces some output. Write down the cost function of the firm. c) Find the Nash equilibrium (91:97) fixed costs are 20. Calculate equilibrium profits. How...
Consider a Cournot game with 2 firms. Inverse demand function is given by P= 20 –...
Consider a Cournot game with 2 firms. Inverse demand function is given by P= 20 – (91 +92). The firm has MC=AC=5. Firms choose qi € (0,0) a) Find the Nash equilibrium (9*.*). Calculate profits in equilibrium. b) Now suppose that a firm also has to pay a fixed cost of 20 if it produces some output. Write down the cost function of the firm. c) Find the Nash equilibrium (9.97) fixed costs are 20. Calculate equilibrium profits. How does...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's...
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Consider a Bertrand duopoly in a market where demand is given by Q firm has constant marginal cost equal to 20 100 - P. Each (a) If the two firms formed a cartel, what would they do? How much profit...
Consider a Bertrand duopoly in a market where demand is given by Q firm has constant marginal cost equal to 20 100 - P. Each (a) If the two firms formed a cartel, what would they do? How much profit would eaclh firm make? (6 marks) (b) Explain why the outcome in part (a) is not a Nash Equilibrium. Find the set of Nash Equilibria and explain why it/they constitute Nash equilibria. (6 marks) (c) Now suppose that instead of...
pls answer as many qwuestions!! 1. A market has an inverse demand curve and four firms,...
pls
answer as many qwuestions!!
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Oligopoly The inverse demand curve for brimstone is given by p(Y) 116-3Y (with Y total quantity...
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Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. Two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. (i)...
Consider a Cournot game with 2 firms. Inverse demand function is given by P = 20 - (91 +92). The firm has MC=AC=5. Firms choose qi e 0,00) a) Find the Nash equilibrium (9:47). Calculate profits in equilibrium. b) Now suppose that a firm also has to pay a fixed cost of 20 if it produces some output. Write down the cost function of the firm. c) Find the Nash equilibrium (91:97) fixed costs are 20. Calculate equilibrium profits. How...
Consider a Cournot game with 2 firms. Inverse demand function is given by P= 20 – (91 +92). The firm has MC=AC=5. Firms choose qi € (0,0) a) Find the Nash equilibrium (9*.*). Calculate profits in equilibrium. b) Now suppose that a firm also has to pay a fixed cost of 20 if it produces some output. Write down the cost function of the firm. c) Find the Nash equilibrium (9.97) fixed costs are 20. Calculate equilibrium profits. How does...
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pls
answer as many qwuestions!!
1. A market has an inverse demand curve and four firms, each of which has a constant marginal cost of. If the firms form a profit-maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level, how much does each firm produce? 2. Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand curve. Each firm has a marginal cost of $60 per unit. a. What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium?...
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