(B) This is not a nash equilibrium because either firm will have an incentive to deviate from the symmetrical equilibrium and increase its profit
Consider a Bertrand duopoly in a market where demand is given by Q firm has constant marginal cost equal to 20 100 - P. Each (a) If the two firms formed a cartel, what would they do? How much profit...
1. Suppose there are two firms with constant marginal cost MC = 3 and the market demand is P = 63 − 5Q. (a) Calculate the market price and profits for each firm in each of the following settings: • Cartel • Cournot duopoly • Bertrand duopoly (firms can set any price) (b) Using part a), construct a 3×3 payoff matrix where the firms are choosing prices. The actions available to each of two players are to charge the price...
Two firms compete in a market with demand given by D(p) = 100 − p, where p is denoted in cents (p=100 is 1 dollar). Firms can only charge prices in whole cents – i.e. p can only take integer values, and not values like 1.5. Marginal costs for each firm are given by MC=10. Firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices. When prices are equal, each firm gets one half of total demand. b. Find all the Nash equilibria of...
Consider the case of two firms competing in a market. Each firm has a constant marginal cost equal to $10. The demand function is D(p) = 100 − p (p is the price in cents) Firms are competing by choosing prices simultaneously. When prices are equal, each firm gets exactly one half of the total demand. P must be an integer value. 1. Find all the Nash equilibria of this duopoly game. 2. Calculate each firms profit under any equilibria. 3....
1 (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, Fi and Fa selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product is 91 (pi,P2) = 10-Pl + 0.5p2: and the demand for F's product is where p is the price charged by F). Both firms have a constant marginal cost of (a) Write down the profits of F1 and F2 as a function of prices P1 and P2. You have b) Derive...
Two firms are price-competing as in the standard Bertrand model. Each faces the market demand function D(p)=50-p. Firm 1 has constant marginal cost c1=10 and firm 2 has c2=20. As usual, if one of the firms has the lower price, they capture the entire market, and when they both charge exactly the same price they share the demand equally. 1. Suppose A1=A2={0.00, 0.01, 0.02,...,100.00}. That is, instead of any real number, we force prices to be listed in whole cents....
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
Consider two firms competing in a market with a demand function P=150-Q. Both firms have constant marginal cost c>0. There are no fixed costs. They compete by setting prices p₁ and p₂ simultaneously. (Bertrand game.) Which of the following statements is not correct? Select one: a. Both firms charging charging p = c is a Nash equilibrium. b. When firm 1 sets where is the industry monopoly price, firm 2's best response is to set . c. When p₁=c, any price p₂≥c...
question 2 answer needed. Ql) Consider an oligopoly with 2 firms. The inverse demand curve is given by P- 100- Q1-Q2. Firm 1's total cost function is TC 30Q1. Firm 2's total cost function is TC2 -20Q2. Analyze this using a Cournot model of oligopoly. Find the Nash Equi- librium quantity that each firm produces. Q2) Analyze the demand and cost functions in Question 1 using a Bertrand model of oligopoly where products are identical. Find the Nash equilbrium(a) prices....
usion (24 points) Two firms are playing a repeated Bertrand game infinitely, each with the same marginal cost 100. The market demand function is P-400-Q. The firm who charges the lower price wins the whole market. When both firms charge the same price, each gets 1/2 of the total market. I. Coll A. (6 points) What price will they choose in the stage (only one period) Nash equilibrium? What price will they choose if in the stage game (only one...
Exercise: Consider a market in which two firms i = 1, 2 produce a homogeneous product at constant marginal cost c = 4, facing total demand described by the linear inverse demand curve P = 16 − Q. First assume that the firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices a la Bertrand. 1. Suppose that F1 expects F2 to set some price p2 above the marginal cost c but below the monopoly price p m. What is F1’s best response BR1(p2)...