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The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 22,000 -5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 2,000QL and CF (QF) = 5,000QF.. a....

The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 22,000 -5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 2,000QL and CF (QF) = 5,000QF..

a. What is the follower’s reaction function?

QF =  - QL
b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.

Leader output:
Follower output:

c. Determine the equilibrium market price.

$

d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower.

Leader profits: $
Follower profits: $

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Answer La followers Profit-s-sjver- 艮 2. Ci) follower < le achon unchon u given bg i Cb) eaders profit Functin iv -2ODD OL us20 00 Q tente 2. er 22000-S (2300 + 550) Leadr Pr

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