3. A firm produces two goods in pure competition and has the following total revenue and total cost function. TR(X1,X2) = 18x1 + 15x2 (a) Maximize profits for the firm, using matrix inversion to...
Each firm produces both goods, i.e., good 1 and good 2. Each firm takes the market prices p 0 and p2 2 0 as firm produces T units of good 1 and x2 units of good 2, with (xi, x2) the total costs of C(x.x) = 2i+0.5«% given and chooses output to maximize profits.1 If a R2, it has 1200 (a) (1 point ) For given prices p1 and p2, find the revenue, R(x1, x2), of a single firm (b)...
3. There are two firms that compete according to Cournot competition. Fim 1 has a cost func tion Cia1) 318. Firm 2 has a cost function C2()3. These firms cannot discriminate, so there is just one price that is determined by the aggregate demand. The inverse demand equation is P Q) 300-0 Where total supply 0-2 (a) Setup the profit maximization problem for firm 1 with all necessary equations plugged in. (2 point) (b) Solve firm I's profit maximization peoblem...
3. There are two firms that compete according to Cournot competition. Firm 1 has a cost function G(91) = 5.59+12. Firm 2 has a cost function C(q2) = 2.5q3 + 18. These firms cannot discriminate, so there is just one price that is determined by the aggregate demand. The inverse demand equation is P(Q) = 600 – 0 Where total supply Q-q1+92. (e) Use your best response equations to mathematically solve for the equilibrium quantities qi 9, Q". equilibrium price...
hi i need answer from part d Question 2 (48 marks) Consider a firm which produces a good, y, using two factors of production, xi and x2 The firm's production function is Note that (4) is a special case of the production function in Question 1, in which α-1/2 and β-14. Consequently, any properties that the production function in Q1 has been shown to possess, must also be possessed by the production function defined in (4). The firm faces exogenously...
usion (24 points) Two firms are playing a repeated Bertrand game infinitely, each with the same marginal cost 100. The market demand function is P-400-Q. The firm who charges the lower price wins the whole market. When both firms charge the same price, each gets 1/2 of the total market. I. Coll A. (6 points) What price will they choose in the stage (only one period) Nash equilibrium? What price will they choose if in the stage game (only one...