Suppose the Department of Health decides to finally start enforcement. Any dispensary found not to be testing in a given period must pay $1,000 and each dispensary has a 20% chance of getting caught for not testing. There are no PR benefits to testing. This yields the payoff matrix:
a) Are there any Nash Equilibria?
b) Are the strategies interdependent?
c) Is there a dominant strategy?
d) Could the dispensaries do better if they could collude?
Suppose the Department of Health decides to finally start enforcement. Any dispensary found not to be testing in a given...
Suppose that the Department of Health continues to not enforce
testing requirements, but patients start to discriminate against
producers that do not test their products, i.e., there are PR
benefits from testing equal to $200, but a dispensary only benefits
if the other dispensary does not test. Again, testing costs $100.
Using the single-period game payoff matrix below, determine how
Dispensary 1 and Dispensary 2 will behave.
a) Are there any Nash Equilibria?
b) Are the strategies interdependent?
c) Is...
Medical cannabis dispensaries in New Mexico are required to test
all batches of product prior to sale. However, enforcement does not
exist. Use the single-period game below to determine whether a
medical cannabis dispensary will test or not. Testing costs
$100.
a) Are there any Nash Equilibria?
b) Are the strategies interdependent?
c) Is there a dominant strategy?
d) Could the dispensaries do better if they could collude?
Dispensary 2 Test -100,-100 | 0, -100 Don't Test -100, 0 Dispensary...