Q. 1. Consider the following pay off matrix of the two players: A and B. What are the Nash equilibria in the game? [3 M...
Q. 1. Consider the following pay off matrix of the two players; A and B. What are the Nash equilibria in the game? Player 2 Strategy D Strategy E Strategy F Player 1 Strategy A 4, 2 13, 6 1, 3 Strategy B 11, 2 0, 0 15, 10 Strategy C 12, 14 4, 11 5, 4
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8 Marks] b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. [6 Marks] c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame. If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1 player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks] [Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the mixed Nash equilibrium of...
GAME MATRIX Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Consider two players (Rose as player...
8. Consider the two-player game described by the payoff matrix below. Player B L R Player A D 0,0 4,4 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game. (b) This game also has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; find the probabilities the players use in this equilibrium, together with an explanation for your answer (c) Keeping in mind Schelling's focal point idea from Chapter 6, what equilibrium do you think is the best prediction of how the game will be...
1. (60 marks) Consider a two-person game, in which every player has two pure strategies to play. The payoff matrix of the game is as follows Strategy 2 Player One Player Two Strategy I Strategy II Strategy 1 0,0 1,3 1,1 Find all the Nash equilibria of the game.
Q.2 Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Player 1 3,2 1,1 -1,3 R. 0,0 Q.2.a Identify the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Q.2.b Identify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria Q.2.c Calculate each player's expected equilibrium payoff.
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Q3 Three-Player Game Consider a 3-player matrix game. The correct interpretation is as follows: the row indicates which strategy was chosen by player I; the column indicates which strategy was chosen by player II. If player III chooses strategy X, then the three players' payoffs are given by the first matrix; if player III chooses strategy Y , then the three players' payoffs are given by the second matrix. II II LR 4, 7, 5 8, 1, 3 1, 1,8...
Brothers: Consider the following game that proceeds in two stages: In the first stage one brother (player 2) has two $10 bills and can choose one of two options: he can give his younger brother (player 1) $20 or give him one of the $10 bills (giving nothing is inconceivable given the way they were raised). This money will then be used to buy snacks at the show they will see, and each $1 of snacks purchased yields one unit...
1. Find the Nash equilibria of the two-player strategic game in which each players set of actions (strategies) is the set of nonnegative numbers and the players payoff functions are ui(a1, a2)- a1 (a2-a1) and u2 (a1, a2) = a2 (1-al-a2).