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6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting...
2. (30 pts) Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition in cigarettes between Philip Morris (biggest...
2. (30 pts) Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition in cigarettes between Philip Morris (biggest brand is Marlboro) and RJ Reynolds (biggest brand is Camel). Phillip Morris is the leader, and Reynolds is the follower. Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P 1000 4Q. Each firm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 20. a) Solve for the Nash equilibrium outcome in quantities, market price, and variable profits b) Suppose Reynold's unit cost of...
2. (15 pts) Consider a Stackelberg duopoly game of quantity competition in U.S. cigarettes between Philip...
2. (15 pts) Consider a Stackelberg duopoly game of quantity competition in U.S. cigarettes between Philip Morris (PM, biggest brand is Marlboro) and RJ Reynolds (RJR, biggest brand is Camel). Philip Morris is the leader, and Reynolds is the follower. (We will obviously ignore state-minimum pricing and taxes for this question.) Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P 12 0.005Q. Each firm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 2. Prices are in S/pack, and...
2. In class we discussed the Stackelberg market competition model in the case where there were...
2. In class we discussed the Stackelberg market competition model in the case where there were two firms sequentially announcing their production quantities qı and q2. Recal that we assumed the firms wish to maximize profit (which equals revenue minus cost) The cost to firm i to produce q, units is cq, and the per unit sales price when Q q2 units are produced in total is P(Q)-α-Q if Q-α and zero otherwise. We assume Suppose now there are three...
Consider a market with Stackelberg competition. The inverse demand curve is P = a−b Q, with...
Consider a market with Stackelberg competition. The inverse demand curve is P = a−b Q, with a=13 and b=3. Firm 1 is the leader and produces at constant marginal costs equal to zero. Firm 2 is the follower and has the cost function: C(q) = cq^2, with c=5. (Note the square on q). What is the equilibrium quantity of firm 1?
Suppose that the inverse market demand for a commodity is given by P = 240 Q...
Suppose that the inverse market demand for a commodity is given by P = 240 Q The cost curves of the three firms which could serve this market are TC,(a) 30q +300 and TC2() (d) Suppose that firms engage in Stackelberg rather than Cournot competition. Firm 1 moves first by choosin its output level. After Firm 1 has chosen its output level, Firm 2 observes ql and chooses its output leve Find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game....
Q.2 Two firms produce homogeneous products. The inverse demand function is: p(x1,x2)-a-x1- x2, where x is...
Q.2 Two firms produce homogeneous products. The inverse demand function is: p(x1,x2)-a-x1- x2, where x is the quantity chosen by firm 1, x2 the quantity chosen by firm 2, and a > 0. The cost functions are C1 (x1)-x follower. and C2(x2)- . Firm I is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2 a Stackelberg Q.2.a Find the subgame-perfect quantities. Q.2.b Calculate each firm's equilibrium profit.
Find the subgame perfect nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the problem: 2 firms are competing (Stackelberg): 1st...
Find the subgame perfect nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the problem: 2 firms are competing (Stackelberg): 1st firm 1 picks q1, then firm 2 observes q1 and picks q2. Price is determined by P(Q) = 40 - q1 - q2. Firms 1 and 2 both have a fixed or marginal cost of 8.
Two profit-maximizing firms compete in a market. Firm 1 chooses quantity qı > 0 and Firm...
Two profit-maximizing firms compete in a market. Firm 1 chooses quantity qı > 0 and Firm 2 chooses quantity 42 > 0. The market price is: p(91,92) = 8 - 2q1 - 42. The cost to Firm 1 of producing qi is C1 = 41. The cost to Firm 2 of producing 92 is C2 = 42 + 42. a.) * Calculate the best-response function for each firm. b.) Suppose the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously. What is the...
6. Entry Deterrence 2: Consider the Cournot duopoly game with demand p= 100 - (qı+q2) and...
6. Entry Deterrence 2: Consider the Cournot duopoly game with demand p= 100 - (qı+q2) and variable costs c;(q;) = 0 for i € {1, 2}. The twist is that there is now a fixed cost of production k > 0 that is the same for both firms. Assume first that both firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Model this as a normal-form game. b. Write down the firm's best-response function for k = 1000 and solve for a pure-strategy Nash...
1. Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA MCB ACA ACB 25 The market demand...
1. Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA MCB ACA ACB 25 The market demand function is given by 0-400 4P. e. Calculate the profits for each firm in the Cournot model. f. g. Is the monopoly outcome stable? If firm A operates under the monopoly outcome, h. Graph the monopoly outcome, cournot outcome and perfect competition...
2. (30 pts) Consider a Stackelberg game of quantity competition in cigarettes between Philip Morris (biggest brand is Marlboro) and RJ Reynolds (biggest brand is Camel). Phillip Morris is the leader, and Reynolds is the follower. Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P 1000 4Q. Each firm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 20. a) Solve for the Nash equilibrium outcome in quantities, market price, and variable profits b) Suppose Reynold's unit cost of...
2. (15 pts) Consider a Stackelberg duopoly game of quantity competition in U.S. cigarettes between Philip Morris (PM, biggest brand is Marlboro) and RJ Reynolds (RJR, biggest brand is Camel). Philip Morris is the leader, and Reynolds is the follower. (We will obviously ignore state-minimum pricing and taxes for this question.) Market demand is described by the inverse demand function P 12 0.005Q. Each firm has a constant unit cost of production equal to 2. Prices are in S/pack, and...
2. In class we discussed the Stackelberg market competition model in the case where there were two firms sequentially announcing their production quantities qı and q2. Recal that we assumed the firms wish to maximize profit (which equals revenue minus cost) The cost to firm i to produce q, units is cq, and the per unit sales price when Q q2 units are produced in total is P(Q)-α-Q if Q-α and zero otherwise. We assume Suppose now there are three...
Suppose that the inverse market demand for a commodity is given by P = 240 Q The cost curves of the three firms which could serve this market are TC,(a) 30q +300 and TC2() (d) Suppose that firms engage in Stackelberg rather than Cournot competition. Firm 1 moves first by choosin its output level. After Firm 1 has chosen its output level, Firm 2 observes ql and chooses its output leve Find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game....
Q.2 Two firms produce homogeneous products. The inverse demand function is: p(x1,x2)-a-x1- x2, where x is the quantity chosen by firm 1, x2 the quantity chosen by firm 2, and a > 0. The cost functions are C1 (x1)-x follower. and C2(x2)- . Firm I is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2 a Stackelberg Q.2.a Find the subgame-perfect quantities. Q.2.b Calculate each firm's equilibrium profit.
Two profit-maximizing firms compete in a market. Firm 1 chooses quantity qı > 0 and Firm 2 chooses quantity 42 > 0. The market price is: p(91,92) = 8 - 2q1 - 42. The cost to Firm 1 of producing qi is C1 = 41. The cost to Firm 2 of producing 92 is C2 = 42 + 42. a.) * Calculate the best-response function for each firm. b.) Suppose the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously. What is the...
6. Entry Deterrence 2: Consider the Cournot duopoly game with demand p= 100 - (qı+q2) and variable costs c;(q;) = 0 for i € {1, 2}. The twist is that there is now a fixed cost of production k > 0 that is the same for both firms. Assume first that both firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Model this as a normal-form game. b. Write down the firm's best-response function for k = 1000 and solve for a pure-strategy Nash...
1. Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA MCB ACA ACB 25 The market demand function is given by 0-400 4P. e. Calculate the profits for each firm in the Cournot model. f. g. Is the monopoly outcome stable? If firm A operates under the monopoly outcome, h. Graph the monopoly outcome, cournot outcome and perfect competition...
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