Homework Answers
Request Answer!
We need at least 10 more requests to produce the answer.
0 / 10 have requested this problem solution
The more requests, the faster the answer.
Add Answer to:
2. In class we discussed the Stackelberg market competition model in the case where there were...
6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting...
6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting to a level of output, and firm 2 moves second after observing firm 1's choice. The market inverse demand curve is given by: P = 110-Q and the firms' cost structures are given by: CQ) K10Q where Kis a fixed cost of production (a Suppos A = 0. Find the quantities and profits for each firm in the subgame perfect Nash equiibru. (4 pts)...
In the Stackelberg model we saw in class there were two firms 1 and 2. Suppose...
In the Stackelberg model we saw in class there were two firms 1 and 2. Suppose that the market demand is p(Q) = 60−Q, where as in class Q is the aggregate quantity. The const function for firm 1 is c1(q1) = 10q1 and the cost function for firm 2 is c2(q2) = q2. Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower. (a) Solve for the follow’s reaction function, and the leader’s maximization problem. (b) Describe the...
The market demand function is Q = 10000 - 1000p Each firm has a marginal cost...
The market demand function is Q = 10000 - 1000p Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. Compare your solution to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are q1 = ____ units and q2= ____ units. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$_____________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_______________ and profit2=$_______________ The Cournot-Nash equilibrium...
7. Consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly game, where the two firms have different costs of production....
7. Consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly game, where the two firms have different costs of production. Firm 1 selects quantity qı at a pro- duction cost of 291. Firm 2 selects quantity 92 and pays the produc- tion cost 492. The market price is given by p = 12 – 91 - 92. Thus, the payoff functions are u(91,92) = (12 – 91 - 92.91 – 291 and uz(9192) = (12 – 91 - 92)92 – 492. Calculate the firms'...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p...
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...
In a Stackelberg model P = a -bQ Two firms are there Q = Q1 +...
In a Stackelberg model
P = a -bQ
Two firms are there
Q = Q1 + Q2
Solve following: a) Let's say the inverse demand is
given by P = 340 - 7Q and the costs are given by C1 = 10 and C2 =
12: Find the P *, Q1*, Q2* , 1* , 2*
b) Let's say the inverse demand is given by P = 200 - 3Q
and the costs are given by C1 =12 and C2 =15. Find the...
2. Consider a Cournot competition model with two firms, 1 and 2. They produce identical goods...
2. Consider a Cournot competition model with two firms, 1 and 2. They produce identical goods in the same market with demand function P= 100-5Q with Q=91 +92. Furthermore, their production process generates pollution to the environment, which increases their cost of production. Their cost functions are given by C1(91,92) = 109,- +5Q and C291,92) = 15922 +45Q. a (10pts) Calculate their equilibrium quantities, price, and profits for both firms. b. (5pts) Consider they collude and form a cartel. That...
Problem 2. Cournot Competition with Three Firms Suppose there are three identical firms engaged in quantity...
Problem 2. Cournot Competition with Three Firms Suppose there are three identical firms engaged in quantity competition. The demand is P = 1 - Q where Q = qi + q2 + q3. To simplify, assume that the marginal cost of production is zero. Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits)
6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting to a level of output, and firm 2 moves second after observing firm 1's choice. The market inverse demand curve is given by: P = 110-Q and the firms' cost structures are given by: CQ) K10Q where Kis a fixed cost of production (a Suppos A = 0. Find the quantities and profits for each firm in the subgame perfect Nash equiibru. (4 pts)...
7. Consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly game, where the two firms have different costs of production. Firm 1 selects quantity qı at a pro- duction cost of 291. Firm 2 selects quantity 92 and pays the produc- tion cost 492. The market price is given by p = 12 – 91 - 92. Thus, the payoff functions are u(91,92) = (12 – 91 - 92.91 – 291 and uz(9192) = (12 – 91 - 92)92 – 492. Calculate the firms'...
In a Stackelberg model
P = a -bQ
Two firms are there
Q = Q1 + Q2
Solve following: a) Let's say the inverse demand is
given by P = 340 - 7Q and the costs are given by C1 = 10 and C2 =
12: Find the P *, Q1*, Q2* , 1* , 2*
b) Let's say the inverse demand is given by P = 200 - 3Q
and the costs are given by C1 =12 and C2 =15. Find the...
2. Consider a Cournot competition model with two firms, 1 and 2. They produce identical goods in the same market with demand function P= 100-5Q with Q=91 +92. Furthermore, their production process generates pollution to the environment, which increases their cost of production. Their cost functions are given by C1(91,92) = 109,- +5Q and C291,92) = 15922 +45Q. a (10pts) Calculate their equilibrium quantities, price, and profits for both firms. b. (5pts) Consider they collude and form a cartel. That...
Problem 2. Cournot Competition with Three Firms Suppose there are three identical firms engaged in quantity competition. The demand is P = 1 - Q where Q = qi + q2 + q3. To simplify, assume that the marginal cost of production is zero. Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits)
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
-
For each of the Z-scores below, determine two probabilities
(show four three decimal places): (1) the...
asked 3 minutes ago -
Oxidative phosphorylation is achieved through chemiosmotic
coupling, which turns chemical energy into osmotic potential energy
that...
asked 2 hours ago -
Hollywood Shoes would like to maintain their cash account at a
minimum level of $64,000, but...
asked 2 hours ago -
Proteins CtrA-P, DnaA, and GcrA behave similarly to what
molecule in the Eukaryotic Cell Cycle?
asked 2 hours ago -
TRUE OR FALSE
In case of a competitive tender procedure, in the request for
quotation, the...
asked 2 hours ago -
I am a little behind please provide some explanation, will
provide thumbs up.
This question considers...
asked 3 hours ago -
Let say the utility function as U(X,Y) = lnX + Y. Show that the
marginal rate...
asked 3 hours ago -
A current of I=8.0A is flowing in a typical extension cord of
length L=3.00m. The cord...
asked 3 hours ago -
1. When balancing the equation H2SO4 (aq) + NaOH (aq) →
Na2SO4(aq) + H2O(aq), would you...
asked 3 hours ago -
Provide a definition of “classification hierarchy” and
illustrate your definition with an example of how and...
asked 3 hours ago -
1. Describe the four main green solvents. Provide one example of
the use of each solvent....
asked 3 hours ago -
International ethics focus on:
1) exploitation of labor
2)corruption
3) environmental impact
4) none of the...
asked 3 hours ago