Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p = 40 - 2Q, and marginal cost is MC = 10 for both firms. No firm faces capacity constraints. Find the BertrandNash equilibrium (prices, quantities, profits consumer surplus, total surplus, herfindahl index and lerner index)
Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p-35 -Q a) Assume that the industry is initially monopolized by an incumbent firm (firm I) which has the exclusive right to use the state-of-the-art technology summarized by the total cost function C-10q. Find the initial monopoly equilibrium (price, quantity, industry profit, consumer surplus and total surplus) and the associated degrees of concentration (Herfindahl index) and market power (Lerner index) b) Assume now that a new firm (firm N) discovers and...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p-35 -Q a) Assume that the industry is initially monopolized by an incumbent firm (firm I) which has the exclusive right to use the state-of-the-art technology summarized by the total cost function C-10q. Find the initial monopoly equilibrium (price, quantity, industry profit, consumer surplus and total surplus) and the associated degrees of concentration (Herfindahl index) and market power (Lerner index) b) Assume now that a new firm (firm N) discovers and...
Suppose two firms are engaged in price competition (also known as Bertrand competition). Neither firm has capacity constraints, and both firms have identical cost structures given by c(y)= 10+ 2y? What are the equilibrium profits for each firm?
2. Suppose two firms are competing in prices (Bertrand) in an industry where demand is P-200-8Q. Assume neither firm faces any fixed costs. (a) If both firms have MC-120, what is the equilibrium price and profits for each firm? (b) Suppose one firm has MC-150 and one has MC-0. How much profit does each firm make? (c) Suppose one firm has MC-120 and one has MC-100. Approximately how much profit does each firm make?
3. Two firms that are engaged in Stackelberg competition face the market inverse demand curve P-100-2Q, where Q is the total 22-0.Sqy, what is Firm 1's (the first-mover's) nverse demand une output, q2. Each firm produces the product at a constant marginal cost of $22. If Firm 2's reaction function is P 56-4 OP=100-2(92-22 + 0.050;) OP=88-1.541 P 88-24
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = C1 and P2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
[Cournot competition with N firms] There are three identical firms in the industry. The inverse demand function is p(Q-1-Q, where Q = q1 +92+93 denotes aggregate output. To facilitate your calculations, assume that the marginal cost for all firms is zero, c 0· 2. (a) Find the best response function for each firm. Interpret b) Compute the Cournot equilibrium. (c) Assume that two of the three firms merge (transforming the industry into a duopoly). Show that the profit of the...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P = 500 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $100 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Show the detail of your work and summarize your results in a table. Outputs Profits il= Cournot 12= Stackelberg Ql= Q2= Q1= Q2= Ql= Q2=...
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = (1 and p2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
2*. Consider a market with two firms where the inverse demand function is given by p = 28 - 2q and where q = q1 + q2. Each firm has the total cost function c(qi) = 4qi, where i = {1,2}. a) Compare price level, quantities and profits in this market calculating the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Draw a graph with best response functions and illustrate the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in that graph. b) Compare your solutions...