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Suppose two firms are engaged in price competition (also known as Bertrand competition). Neither firm has...
What missing information do you need? That's the question. that's all the question provided us. Suppose...
What missing information do you need? That's the question.
that's all the question provided us.
Suppose two firms are engaged in price competition (also known as Bertrand competition). Neither firm has capacity constraints, and both firms have identical cost structures given by c(y)= 10 + 2y What are the equilibrium profits for each firm? Question 26 pts Suppose two forms are engaged in price competition (also known as Bertrand competition. Neither form has capacity constraints, and both firms have identical...
Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p...
Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p = 40 - 2Q, and marginal cost is MC = 10 for both firms. No firm faces capacity constraints. Find the BertrandNash equilibrium (prices, quantities, profits consumer surplus, total surplus, herfindahl index and lerner index)
Consider a market where n firms are engaged in quantity competition (also known as Cournot competition),...
Consider a market where n firms are engaged in quantity competition (also known as Cournot competition), where n is a natural number. Each firm has the same cost structures given by c(y)= 10 + 2y3 What will the profits for each firm be as n gets larger and larger? In other words, what will the profits of each firm be as n approaches infinity?
Problem 1. Cournot Competition with Two Firms Suppose there are two identical firms engaged in quantity competition (Co...
Problem 1. Cournot Competition with Two Firms Suppose there are two identical firms engaged in quantity competition (Cournot competition). The demand is P=1-Q where Q =91 +92. Assume that firm's i total cost of production is TC(qi) Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits).
Problem 1. Cournot Competition with Two Firms Suppose there are two identical firms engaged in quantity...
Problem 1. Cournot Competition with Two Firms Suppose there are two identical firms engaged in quantity competition (Cournot competition). The demand is P 1 - Qwhere Q qi 2. Assume that firm's i total cost of production is TC(q) = . Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits)
consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There are two firms that produce a homogenous...
consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There
are two firms that produce a homogenous good with the same constant
marginal cost of c.
a) Suppose that the rule for splitting up cunsumers when the
prices are equal assigns all consumers to firm1 when both firms
charge the same price. show that (p1,p2) =(c,c) is a Nash
equilibrium and that no other pair of prices is a Nash
equilibrium.
b) Now, we assume that the Bertrand game in part...
Problem 2. Cournot Competition with Three Firms Suppose there are three identical firms engaged in quantity competition...
Problem 2. Cournot Competition with Three Firms Suppose there are three identical firms engaged in quantity competition. The demand is P=1-Q where Q = 91 +92 +93. To simplify, assume that the marginal cost of production is zero. Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits).
Problem 3. Cournot Competition with Different Costs Suppose there are two firms engaged in quantity competition....
Problem 3. Cournot Competition with Different Costs Suppose there are two firms engaged in quantity competition. The demand is P = 2 - Q where Q=q1 +22. Assume cı = { and c2 = , i.e., Firm 2 is more efficient. Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits). price, and profits).
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by...
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = C1 and P2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
Suppose four firms engage in price competition in Bertrand setting in which the lowest-price firm will...
Suppose four firms engage in price competition in Bertrand setting in which the lowest-price firm will capture the entire market. The firms differ with respect to their costs: ? Firm A’s marginal cost per unit is 8 USD ? Firm B’s marginal cost per unit is 7 USD ? Firm C’s marginal cost per unit is 9 USD ? Firm D’s marginal cost per unit is 7.5 USD (a) Which firm will serve the market? What price it would charge?...
What missing information do you need? That's the question.
that's all the question provided us.
Suppose two firms are engaged in price competition (also known as Bertrand competition). Neither firm has capacity constraints, and both firms have identical cost structures given by c(y)= 10 + 2y What are the equilibrium profits for each firm? Question 26 pts Suppose two forms are engaged in price competition (also known as Bertrand competition. Neither form has capacity constraints, and both firms have identical...
Consider a market where n firms are engaged in quantity competition (also known as Cournot competition), where n is a natural number. Each firm has the same cost structures given by c(y)= 10 + 2y3 What will the profits for each firm be as n gets larger and larger? In other words, what will the profits of each firm be as n approaches infinity?
Problem 1. Cournot Competition with Two Firms Suppose there are two identical firms engaged in quantity competition (Cournot competition). The demand is P=1-Q where Q =91 +92. Assume that firm's i total cost of production is TC(qi) Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits).
Problem 1. Cournot Competition with Two Firms Suppose there are two identical firms engaged in quantity competition (Cournot competition). The demand is P 1 - Qwhere Q qi 2. Assume that firm's i total cost of production is TC(q) = . Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits)
consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There
are two firms that produce a homogenous good with the same constant
marginal cost of c.
a) Suppose that the rule for splitting up cunsumers when the
prices are equal assigns all consumers to firm1 when both firms
charge the same price. show that (p1,p2) =(c,c) is a Nash
equilibrium and that no other pair of prices is a Nash
equilibrium.
b) Now, we assume that the Bertrand game in part...
Problem 2. Cournot Competition with Three Firms Suppose there are three identical firms engaged in quantity competition. The demand is P=1-Q where Q = 91 +92 +93. To simplify, assume that the marginal cost of production is zero. Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits).
Problem 3. Cournot Competition with Different Costs Suppose there are two firms engaged in quantity competition. The demand is P = 2 - Q where Q=q1 +22. Assume cı = { and c2 = , i.e., Firm 2 is more efficient. Compute the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., quantities, price, and profits). price, and profits).
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = C1 and P2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
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