Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and is $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs. That is, marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm.
Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience, because nothing in the model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (X symbol) on the graph that follows to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. Drop lines will extend to both axes automatically.
When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce _______ cans per day and charge _______ per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of _______ , so the total industry profit in the beer market is _______ per day.
Oligopolists often behave uncooperatively and act in their own self-interest, even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms agree to produce the same quantity. Consider the profit-maximizing level of output for each firm. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50% of Mays' portion of the collusive output, whereas McCovey continues to produce the same amount as in the collusive agreement.
Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to _______ to _______ per can. Mays's profit is now _______ per day, whereas McCovey's profit is now _______ per day.
Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit _______ when Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity.
Blank 1: 160000
Blank 2: 1.2
Blank 3: 128000 (160000*(1.2-0.4))
Blank 4: 256000
blank 5: Decrease
blank 6: 1.0
Blank 7: 144000 (160000*1.5*(1.0-0.4))
Blank 8: 96000 (160000*(1.0-0.4))
Blank 9: Decreases
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly).
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $1.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience: nothing in this model requires...
2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $1.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm.Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
Daisy and Petunia are flower vendors that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a bouquet of flowers is constant and equals $1.20 per bouquet. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs. That is, marginal cost equals average cost (AC) for each firm. Suppose that Daisy and Petunia form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience, since nothing in the model requires that the two...
2. Deviating from the collusive outcomeMays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires...
16. An industry has two firms. The cost function of Firm 1 is ci(q) 2q + 500, and the cost function of Firm 2 is cz(g) - 2q + 400. The demand function for the output of this industry is a downward-sloping straight line. In a Cournot equilibrium in which both firms produce positive amounts of output: a. Total output of both firms is less than the cartel (joint-profit maximizing) output b. Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce the same...