Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm.
Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.)
Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together.
When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce _______ cans and charge $_______ per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of _______ so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is _______ .
Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit.
Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the
collusive agreement.
Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to _______ to $_______ per can. Mays's profit is now _______ while McCovey's profit is now $_______ .Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit _______ when Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity.
(1) A cartel (operating like a monopoly) outcome occurs at intersection of MR & MC curves, with price $1.2 and total output of 160.
(2) When they behave as cartel, each company will produce 80 (= 160/2) cans and each will charge $1.2 per can. Each firm earns daily profit of $32 [= Firm output x (Price - ATC) = 80 x $(1.2 - 0.8) = 80 x $0.4 = $32 per firm], so industry profit in beer market is $64 (= $32 x 2, since there are two firms equally sharing the output).
(3) When Mays deviates from cartel, Mays produces 120 cans (= 80 x 1.5) but McCovey continues to produce 80 cans. Industry quantity is now 200 cans (= 120 + 80). With this outcome,
May's deviation causes price of beer to decrease to $1.1 (corresponding to quantity of 200 in demand curve). May's profit is now $36 [= 120 x $(1.1 - 0.8) = 120 x $0.3 = $36], while McCovey's profit is $24 [= 80 x $(1.1 - 0.8) = 80 x $0.3 = $24]. Therefore, total industry profit decreases [Now, total industry profit = $36 + $24 = $60, which is less than total industry profit of $64 with the initial cartel].
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly).
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $1.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and is $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs. That is, marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience, because nothing in the model requires that the two...
2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience: nothing in this model requires...
2. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies...
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $1.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm.Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must...
2. Deviating from the collusive outcomeMays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires...
Daisy and Petunia are flower vendors that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a bouquet of flowers is constant and equals $1.20 per bouquet. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs. That is, marginal cost equals average cost (AC) for each firm. Suppose that Daisy and Petunia form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience, since nothing in the model requires that the two...
16. An industry has two firms. The cost function of Firm 1 is ci(q) 2q + 500, and the cost function of Firm 2 is cz(g) - 2q + 400. The demand function for the output of this industry is a downward-sloping straight line. In a Cournot equilibrium in which both firms produce positive amounts of output: a. Total output of both firms is less than the cartel (joint-profit maximizing) output b. Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce the same...