QUESTION 6 Only! 4) Draw the normal-form matrix for each of the following extensive-form games 2...
Game Theory:
I only need help with 6 (a & b)!
Will rate for correct and descriptive
answers!
Draw the normal-form matrix for each of the following extensive-form games C 0,0 E 2,2 F3,4 4, 0 3,2 6) Use your normal-form matrix for (4b) above. Assume that ơ,-( ). , a. Find ui(IU, ơ2) and ui(ID, ơ2). b. Assume 0 (IU)-2/3 and 0(ID)-1/3 Find player l's expected payout. Then find player 2's expected payout. Which is higher?
3. Draw the normal-form matrix of each of the following extensive-form games C0,0 E 2,2 F3,4 4,0 3,2 A 3,3 5, 4 E 6,2 2,6 2,2
Game Theory:
I only need help with 5 (a & b).
Will rate for correct and descriptive answers!
4 Draw the normal-form matrix for each of the following extensive-form games. C 0,0 E 2,2 F3,4 1 U 4,0 (b) 11 3,2 5) Use your normal-form matrix for (4a) above. Assume that ơi-( Find the following: , , ). a. ui(oi, CE
4. (General Extensive Form Game ID Suppose the following general extensive-form game. Player 1 Player 2 (0, 4) (4,0 (4, 0) (0, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy (Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Does a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium exist? If so, show it (or them). If not, prove it.
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
Problem 1. Consider the following extensive form game. 2 > 2,3 4,1 3,2 1.2 (a) By converting the game into normal form game (by finding the corre- sponding bimatrix game), find all Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) Does player 2 have a strictly dominated strategy?
3. General Extensive Form Game D Suppose the following general extensive form game 1/2 1/2 (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 6) (6, 0 (0,0 (6, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Find pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game. c) Find pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.
Q.1 Consider the following extensive-form game: Playxo Playr 2 o Player? 8, 6 8,5 7, 6 9, 7 Q.1.a Depict the corresponding normal form of the game. Q.1.b Identify the Nash equilibria. Q.1.c Identify the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by using backward induction.
Question 2 Consider the following extensive form game. R 2 a А/ B 2,3 / 1 \ь 3, x 3,0 1, Each value of x defines a different game. 1. Solve this game by backward induction for x = 0 and for x = 2. For each of those values of x, what are the payoffs that player 2 can get in the solution? 2. Write this game in Normal form (The table can have an entry of the form...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...