Question 2 Consider the following extensive form game. R 2 a А/ B 2,3 / 1...
Question 1 Consider the following extensive-form game. y R 2 А/ B 1,3 ay 1,-1 3,-2 2,-1 4,-2 1. What are the possible strategies of Player 1? 2. Write the game in normal form. 3. Solve this game using backward induction.
Problem 1. Consider the following extensive form game. 2 > 2,3 4,1 3,2 1.2 (a) By converting the game into normal form game (by finding the corre- sponding bimatrix game), find all Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) Does player 2 have a strictly dominated strategy?
Q.1 Consider the following extensive-form game: Playxo Playr 2 o Player? 8, 6 8,5 7, 6 9, 7 Q.1.a Depict the corresponding normal form of the game. Q.1.b Identify the Nash equilibria. Q.1.c Identify the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by using backward induction.
1. Consider the following extensive game: F G 2,1 3,1 0,2 2,3 (i) List all of player 2's strategies. (2 points) (ii) Construct a payoff matrix and identify all Nash equilibria to the game. (2 points) (iii) Use backwards induction to find all subgame perfect equilibria of the game. (2 points)
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
3. The extensive form of a 2-person game is as follows: () (1019 (a) What are the pure strategy sets for players I and II? (b) Derive the normal (strategie) form of the game. (c) Use backward induction to find the sub-game perfect Nash Equi libria of the game. There are 2 SPNEs.) (d) Is there any other Nash Equilibrium?
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
Consider the extensive form game above. The game has__________ subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CE) leads to a payoff of_________ for Player 1 and____________ for Player 2. In the backward induction equilibrium in pure strategies Player 2 gets a payoff of______________ (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1, 2, 3,....).
Consider the extensive form game above. The game has _______
proper subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CF) leads to a payoff
of _______ for Player 1 and _________ for Player 2. In the backward
induction equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 2 gets a payoff of
____________ (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1, 2,
3,....).
2 36 8 LM 2 2 2 4 2 5
Consider the following extensive form game.
What is the subgame perfect equilibrium path in this game?
1 L R M 2 2 1 а) r b а/ь 0 X 2 0 0 2 0 -1 у X у 1 1 2 -1 1 10 0 0 1