Question

2 36 8 LM 2 2 2 4 2 5

Consider the extensive form game above. The game has _______ proper subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CF) leads to a payoff of _______ for Player 1 and _________ for Player 2. In the backward induction equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 2 gets a payoff of ____________ (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1, 2, 3,....).

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

1) 6 proper subgames

2) 6 for Player 1

3) 7 for Player 2

4) Player 2 gets a payoff of 3

Explanation

1)There are a total of 7 subgames (each one starting at a node). One of them is the game itself. So, the number of proper subgames is 7-1=6

2&3) Suppose Player 1 plays strategy A, Player 2 plays strategy C, Player 1 plays G, Player 2 plays F, Player 1 plays M. Then the payoff is (6,7). That is, Player 1 gets a payoff of 6 and Player 2 gets a payoff of 7.

4) Among K and L, Player 1 will choose L as it has a higher payoff for him. This will give Player 2 a payoff of 6. So, Player 2 knows that of he choose E, he will get a payoff of 6 and Player 1 will get a payoff of 3.

With a similar argument, if Player 2 choose F, he will get a payoff of only 1 (and Player 1 gets 8). So, player 2 will choose E over F to maximise his payoff.

So, if Player 1 choose G, (Player 2 will choose E and Player 1 will choose L), he will get a payoff of 3. Whereas if Player 1 choose H, he will get a payoff of 7. So, Player 2 will choose H giving Player 1 a payoff of 3. So, if Player 2 choose C, instead of D, he will get a payoff of 3. Whereas, by similar argument, if he choose D, he will get a payoff of only 2. Hence Player 2 will choose C over D. So Player 1 will be getting a payoff of 7 of he choose A while he will get only 5 is he choose B.

Hence the choices will be A, C, H. And player 2 will get a payoff of 3.

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Consider the extensive form game above. The game has _______ proper subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM,...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • Consider the extensive form game above. The game has__________ subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CE) leads...

    Consider the extensive form game above. The game has__________ subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CE) leads to a payoff of_________ for Player 1 and____________ for Player 2. In the backward induction equilibrium in pure strategies Player 2 gets a payoff of______________ (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1, 2, 3,....).

  • 2,4 3, 6 6,7 7, 3 8, 1 9.2 4, 5 5, 4 Consider the extensive...

    2,4 3, 6 6,7 7, 3 8, 1 9.2 4, 5 5, 4 Consider the extensive form game above. The game has for Plasyer 2. In the backward induction equilibrium in pure strategies Player 2 gets a payott of subgames. The strategy profile (AGUKM, CED) leads to a payoff of for Player 1 and (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0. 1.2,3)

  • In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1...

    In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...

  • Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...

    Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8 Marks] b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. [6 Marks] c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame. If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1 player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks] [Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the mixed Nash equilibrium of...

  • Consider a game in which Player 1 first selects between L and R. If Player 1...

    Consider a game in which Player 1 first selects between L and R. If Player 1 selects L, then players 1 and 2 play a prisoner’s dilemma game represented in the strategic form above. If Player 1 selects R then, Player 1 and 2 play the battle-of-the-sexes game in which they simultaneously and independently choose between A and B. If they both choose A, then the payoff vector is (4,4). If they both choose B, then the payoff vector is...

  • led Notes Problem.4: Strategies and Subgames (4 pts) Consider the following game tree: The payoffs in...

    led Notes Problem.4: Strategies and Subgames (4 pts) Consider the following game tree: The payoffs in this game tree have been left blank, because they will not matter in this question. Additionally, the decision nodes have been marked so that they can be referred to easily: 1A,1B. IC, and ID are all decision nodes belonging to Player 1, while 2A, 2B, and 2C all belong to Player 2. a) How many strategies does each player have? (Remember that a strategy...

  • A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure...

    A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0, 1, 2, 3,....) B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply)    a) (WY, AD)    b) (WY, AC)    c) (ZX, AD)    d) (ZY, BC)    e) (ZY, BD)   ...

  • The extensive form of a 2pemon game as follones R. (a) What are the pure strategy...

    The extensive form of a 2pemon game as follones R. (a) What are the pure strategy sets for players I and II. (b) Derive the normal (strategie) form of the game? (e) Use backward induction to find the sub-game perfect Nash Equi- librium of the game. (d) Find the other Nash Equilibrium and explain why it is not sub game perfect.

  • Question 1 o, 0 0 21 2 0 0 Consider the extensive form game portrayed above....

    Question 1 o, 0 0 21 2 0 0 Consider the extensive form game portrayed above. The top number at a terminal node is player 1's payoff, the middle number is player 2's payoff and the bottom number is player 3's payof. a. Derive the strategy set for each player. (Note: If you do not want to list all of the strategies, you can provide a general description of a player's strategy, give an example, and state how many strategies...

  • 2,4 3, 6 6,7 7, 3 19.2 8,1 4, 5 subgames. The sralegy prulile (AJKM, CE)...

    2,4 3, 6 6,7 7, 3 19.2 8,1 4, 5 subgames. The sralegy prulile (AJKM, CE) leads to a payoll cr Coisider the exleresive rn gatrie abve The gae as strategies Player 2 gets a payoff of Flease, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1,2,3.. Tor Player 1 ar tx Player 2 In the xarkwaicd irductin equiriurn iri pure

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT