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Question 1 o, 0 0 21 2 0 0 Consider the extensive form game portrayed above....
2. Consider the extensive form game shown in the figure below. The top payoff at a terminal node ...
2. Consider the extensive form game shown in the figure below. The top payoff at a terminal node is for player 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria P1 P2 P2 P1 P1 0 10 4 4 4
2. Consider the extensive form game shown in the figure below. The top payoff at a terminal node is for player 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria P1 P2 P2 P1 P1 0 10 4 4 4
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information: 2 In 0 (a) (Level A)...
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information: 2 In 0 (a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive formm game (b) (Level A) First suppose = 0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect. (d) (Level B) Now suppose α = 3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi- libria....
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: &n...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...
3. General Extensive Form Game D Suppose the following general extensive form game 1/2 1/2 (2,...
3. General Extensive Form Game D Suppose the following general extensive form game 1/2 1/2 (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 6) (6, 0 (0,0 (6, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Find pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game. c) Find pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure...
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in
the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0,
1, 2, 3,....)
B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply)
a) (WY, AD)
b) (WY, AC)
c) (ZX, AD)
d) (ZY, BC)
e) (ZY, BD)
...
1. Consider the following normal form game: 112 L CR T 10 102 12 0 13...
1. Consider the following normal form game: 112 L CR T 10 102 12 0 13 M 12 25 5 0 0 B|13 010 011 a) (Level A) First suppose this game is played only once. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria? (b) (Level B) Now suppose this game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice....
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
2. Consider the extensive form game shown in the figure below. The top payoff at a terminal node is for player 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria P1 P2 P2 P1 P1 0 10 4 4 4
2. Consider the extensive form game shown in the figure below. The top payoff at a terminal node is for player 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria P1 P2 P2 P1 P1 0 10 4 4 4
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information: 2 In 0 (a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive formm game (b) (Level A) First suppose = 0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect. (d) (Level B) Now suppose α = 3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi- libria....
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
3. General Extensive Form Game D Suppose the following general extensive form game 1/2 1/2 (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 6) (6, 0 (0,0 (6, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Find pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game. c) Find pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in
the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0,
1, 2, 3,....)
B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply)
a) (WY, AD)
b) (WY, AC)
c) (ZX, AD)
d) (ZY, BC)
e) (ZY, BD)
...
1. Consider the following normal form game: 112 L CR T 10 102 12 0 13 M 12 25 5 0 0 B|13 010 011 a) (Level A) First suppose this game is played only once. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria? (b) (Level B) Now suppose this game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
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