Question

3842 4 6 3 2 2

A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0, 1, 2, 3,....)

B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply)

   a) (WY, AD)

   b) (WY, AC)

   c) (ZX, AD)

   d) (ZY, BC)

   e) (ZY, BD)

   f) (ZX, BC)

Answer 1

Given that, the enterprise form game of complete and imperfect information is set is {0, 1, 2, 3, ....} So set {1}, {w, z} Z is set given = {(6, 4), (5, 2)} = {6 + 3, 4 + 2} = {9, 6}. Z = {9, 6} w is set = {A, B} And A is set = {x, y} = {(5, 0), (8, 5)} = {(3 + 8), (0 + 5)} A = {(1, 5)} \r\n And is set of = {x, y} = {(4, 6), (2, 1)} = {(4 + 2), (6 + 1)} B = {6, 7} Then w is = {A, B} = {(11, 5), (6, 7)} = {(11 + 6), (5 + 7)} = {17, 12} Set is {w, z} = {(17, 12), 99, 6)} The rule game starting with player 2 segment to player 1 choosing w. we have a simultaneous game between 1 and 2. Two Nash equilibriums (y, A) (x, B)
>> Thus the SPNE of the game is (ZX, BC)

SO the correct option is (f).

This may helps you.

Thank you.! ?