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2,4 3, 6 6,7 7, 3 8, 1 9.2 4, 5 5, 4 Consider the extensive form game above. The game has for Plasyer 2. In the backward induction equilibrium in pure strategies Player 2 gets a payott of subgames. The strategy profile (AGUKM, CED) leads to a payoff of for Player 1 and (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0. 1.2,3)
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subgame is a Part ot the exknsive forn begnong uith a decis。 T m ioctuding eeyhing htnch out to -the ighto t. A from e tee above Jc con see th there are 8 pruper Subgames. The batkssard nuon g* Stages are iuwn belo STAGE I ガ > 시 ,3 T, L 2 8, 小.STAGE 2 F 3,6 с. 8 5,4 S TAGk 3 a, 3 C1,2) 5,ч C5,4)

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