Consider an economy occupied by two households (i- A, B) who are facing the two-period consumption...
Consider an economy occupied by many households with two types denoted by i, (i- A, B) who are facing the two-period consumption problem. Each household i- A, B is facing the following utility maximization problem: max subject to ci bi(1+r)bo where yl and yẳ are household is exogenous income in period t 1, 2 . CI and då are household i's consumption in period t = 1.2. , bị is household i's bond holdings of which bo is exogenously given,...
3. Heterogeneous Agents Con sider an economy occupied by many households with two types denoted by i, (i-A, B) who are facing the two-period consumption problem. Each household i-A, B is facing the following utility maximization problem max where yl and yå are household i's exogenous income in period t-1,2 cl and c are hou sehold is con sumption in period t-1,2. b, bi is household i's bond holdings of which bo is exogenously given, r is the real interest...
Consider a two-period economy discussed in Chapter 9. Suppose there are only two households, and each household's utility function and endowment are given as follows. u' (C1,C2) = (C122) and e' = (18,4). u? (C1,C2) = Incı + 2 Inc and e? = (3,6). el denote the allocation of endowment income for household i. For simplicity, there is no government, and therefore no tax in both periods. There is a perfectly competitive credit (financial market in which they can buy...
5. Consider the representative household in the static two-good consumption model whose preferences are represented by u(ci, c2)= / 2, with each good priced at P and P2. The household receives an exogenous amount of income, Y. (a) Using a Lagrangian, and derive the first order conditions for ci and c2 (b) Use the first-order conditions to derive the consumer's optimality condition. (c) Solve for the demand functions of ci and c2 (d) Suppose a shock increases P. Using comparative...
Consider a household living for two periods, t = 1, 2. Let ct and yt denote consumption and income in period t. s denotes saving in period 1, r is the real interest rate and β the weight the household places on future utility. The following must be true about the household’s consumption in the two periods:c1 = y1 − sandc2 = (1 + r)s + y2a. Derive the household’s intertemporal budget constraint.b. Assume that the preferences of the household can be represented by a log utility...
Hi, I need your answer for both part A and B this question very quickly.Br/H Consider a household living for two periods. The intertemporal budget constraint is given by: ?1 + ?2 /1 + r = ?1 + y2/1+r , where C is consumption, ? is income and ? is the interest rate. The household’s preferences are characterised by the utility function: ?(?1, ?2 ) = ?(?1) + ??(?2) where ?(?t) is the period utility function and ? < 1 is...
1. Consider an agent who values consumption in period 0 and 1 according to the following utility function: u(co, C)In(Co)+8 In(c1) is a discount factor (5 < 1) which indicates that the agnet prefers to consume today more than he can tomorrow. Suppose that the agent is given a total wealth today of w and that he may save any portion of this money in order to consume tomorrow. If he saves money he is paid interest r. Thus the...
1. This problem asks you to consider the effects of a distortionary tax on consumption. Let utility be given by U = Inc+ ß In c' with budget constraints c(1+t) = yes d' (1+t) = y +s (1+r). (a) Solve the budget constraints for c and d and substitute the resulting expressions into utility, writing utility as a function of s. Maximize utility with respect to s. Write an expression for the Euler equation. (b) Does the distortionary tax affect...
Hi, can someone please help me with this Macroeconomics question? Thank you! nomy: Consider a static, one-per Static One Period Model of the Eco iod model of the economy. There 1s a representative household who can choose how much to consume and how much to work. There is no saving since the model is static. The household problem is C,N I have dropped the t subscripts since there is only one period. Here N is hours of labor, C is...
Problem 2. (Impatient consumers) Consider an economy where agents live for two periods. There are two types of agents A and B. Both types of agents are impatient, so value of consumption in period 2 is less than value of consumption in period 1. Their preferences are described by the utility function where 0< 81 ( being less than 1 reflects impatience). Type A's endowment pattern is (n,ni)-(EAN) where Ea > 0. Type B's endowment pattern is u'of)- (0, Ep)...