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3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's...
3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's...
3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's marginal cost is 10, and fim 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10points) Derive the best response function for each firm B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium. T. (5 points) Find the equilibrium market price and each firm's equilibrium profit. D. (5 points) Find the consumer surplus at the market equilibrium.
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P=130-Q. Consumers only...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P=130-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price. they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below 10 at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain your reason. B....
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-130-Q, Consumers only buy from...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-130-Q, Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price, they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below your reason. at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain B. (6...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-180-Q. Consumers only...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-180-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price, they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 30, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 30. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below 30 at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain your reason B....
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q =...
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q = 18 – P with the cost (c(Q) =*Q). a. Set up firm l's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm l's best response function. c. Solve for firm l's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm...
Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm is MCA = MCB = 40. The inverse demand function is P = 130 - Q. Find the Nash equilibrium quantities for each firm and the market price.
Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and Firm Y operate. Each...
Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and Firm Y operate. Each firm has marginal cost equal to $20, and the market demand is Q = 100 - (1/2) P. There are no fixed costs. a) Show the best-response function of each firm. b) Calculate the profit-maximizing output level for each firm. c) What is the equilibrium price? d) Calculate the profit for each firm.
In the market of cournot competition, the aggregate market demand is P 100 4Q a. There...
In the market of cournot competition, the aggregate market demand is P 100 4Q a. There exists two firms in the market, with identical production technology, i.e. mci = m2-20. Calculate the cournot equilibrium in this case. Also, draw the best response functions for firm 1 and firm 2 in the((2) plane b. There exists two firms in the market, with different production technology, i.e. mci = 10 and m2-30. Calculate the cournot equilibrium in this case. Also, draw the...
3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's marginal cost is 10, and fim 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10points) Derive the best response function for each firm B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium. T. (5 points) Find the equilibrium market price and each firm's equilibrium profit. D. (5 points) Find the consumer surplus at the market equilibrium.
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P=130-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price. they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below 10 at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain your reason. B....
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-130-Q, Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price, they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below your reason. at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain B. (6...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-180-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price, they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 30, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 30. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below 30 at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain your reason B....
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q = 18 – P with the cost (c(Q) =*Q). a. Set up firm l's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm l's best response function. c. Solve for firm l's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
In the market of cournot competition, the aggregate market demand is P 100 4Q a. There exists two firms in the market, with identical production technology, i.e. mci = m2-20. Calculate the cournot equilibrium in this case. Also, draw the best response functions for firm 1 and firm 2 in the((2) plane b. There exists two firms in the market, with different production technology, i.e. mci = 10 and m2-30. Calculate the cournot equilibrium in this case. Also, draw the...
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