Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and Firm Y operate. Each...
Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and Firm Y operate. Each firm has marginal cost equal to $20, and the market demand is Q = 100 - (1/2) P. There are no fixed costs.
a) Show the best-response function of each firm.
b) Calculate the profit-maximizing output level for each firm.
c) What is the equilibrium price?
d) Calculate the profit for each firm.
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Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and
Firm Y operate. Each...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
A market is organized as a duopoly, and the market demand function is Q = 1000...
A market is organized as a duopoly, and the market demand function is Q = 1000 - 1000P. Each of the two firms has a constant marginal cost equal to $0.28 per unit of output. a) Derive the best-response function for each firm. b) Calculate the equilibrium quantity supplied in the market and the equilibrium price. c) Calculate the profit level for each firm.
Now consider a typical Cournot duopoly situation such that the market is being served by two...
Now consider a typical Cournot duopoly situation such that the market is being served by two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) that simultaneously decide on the level of output to sell in the market, while producing an identical product. The total output of the industry is Q = q1 + q2, where q1 and q2 are the output of Firm 1 and 2, respectively. Each firm has a symmetric cost function: C(q1) = 12 q1 and C(q2) = 12...
3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's...
3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's marginal cost is 10, and fim 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10points) Derive the best response function for each firm B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium. T. (5 points) Find the equilibrium market price and each firm's equilibrium profit. D. (5 points) Find the consumer surplus at the market equilibrium.
Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms...
Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms have constant marginal cost of $20 and zero fixed cost. Market demand is given by: P = 140 − qA − qB. (a) Derive the best-response functions for each firm and plot them on the same graph. (b) Calculate the profits of each firm in the Nash Equilibrium outcome.
3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's...
3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's marginal cost is 10. and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10 points) Derive the best response function for each firm. B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium.
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit func...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit function, and the first order condition. (b) Find out the profit maximizing output for each firm. (c) Find the pofit earned by each firm, total profit eamed by the two fims to (d) Now assume that the two firms collude and act as a monopoly....
) TUU 100 2. The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P=20 30...
) TUU 100 2. The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P=20 30 +) and costs are C(q) = 26Q, and C2(Q) = 32Q2. (LOI, LO3) a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output. c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium. .
4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let...
4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let yi and y2 denote the quantities 1 and 2, respectively. Let P(Y) = 100-Y be the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y y1 +y2. Assume that the cost function of firm 1 and firm 2 are as follows. C1(n)-60y1 and C2(2) 60y2. (a) Write down the profit function of firm 1 and firm 2. (of a homogeneous product) produced...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's marginal cost is 10, and fim 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10points) Derive the best response function for each firm B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium. T. (5 points) Find the equilibrium market price and each firm's equilibrium profit. D. (5 points) Find the consumer surplus at the market equilibrium.
3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's marginal cost is 10. and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10 points) Derive the best response function for each firm. B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium.
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit function, and the first order condition. (b) Find out the profit maximizing output for each firm. (c) Find the pofit earned by each firm, total profit eamed by the two fims to (d) Now assume that the two firms collude and act as a monopoly....
) TUU 100 2. The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P=20 30 +) and costs are C(q) = 26Q, and C2(Q) = 32Q2. (LOI, LO3) a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output. c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium. .
4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let yi and y2 denote the quantities 1 and 2, respectively. Let P(Y) = 100-Y be the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y y1 +y2. Assume that the cost function of firm 1 and firm 2 are as follows. C1(n)-60y1 and C2(2) 60y2. (a) Write down the profit function of firm 1 and firm 2. (of a homogeneous product) produced...
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