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3. Coumot Competibion (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p-130-q-q Firm l's...
3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's...
3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's marginal cost is 10. and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10 points) Derive the best response function for each firm. B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium.
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P=130-Q. Consumers only...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P=130-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price. they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below 10 at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain your reason. B....
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-130-Q, Consumers only buy from...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-130-Q, Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price, they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below your reason. at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain B. (6...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q =...
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q = 18 – P with the cost (c(Q) =*Q). a. Set up firm l's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm l's best response function. c. Solve for firm l's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Consider a market with two firms in Cournot (quantity) competition. Market demand is given by q(p)...
Consider a market with two firms in Cournot (quantity) competition. Market demand is given by q(p) = a − p. Each firm faces a constant marginal cost of c. a. (15 points) Suppose that the government imposes a unit tax of δ, so that if a firm sells q units of the good, that firm owes q · δ to the government. Find the equilibrium quantity, price paid by consumers, consumer surplus, and tax revenue. Your answers should be functions...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
1. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is p (Q) = 24 Q. Firm 1 has constant average and marginal costs of $12 per unit, while firms 2 and 3 have constan...
1. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is p (Q) = 24 Q. Firm 1 has constant average and marginal costs of $12 per unit, while firms 2 and 3 have constant average and marginal costs of $15 per unit. a)Verify that the following are Nash equilibrium quantities for this market: q1 = 9 / 2 and q2 = q3 = 3 / 2 . b)How much profit does each firm earn...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit func...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit function, and the first order condition. (b) Find out the profit maximizing output for each firm. (c) Find the pofit earned by each firm, total profit eamed by the two fims to (d) Now assume that the two firms collude and act as a monopoly....
3. Cournot Competition (26 points) Consider a Cournot model. The market demand is p=130-41-42. Firm l's marginal cost is 10. and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (10 points) Derive the best response function for each firm. B. (6 points) Find the Nash Equilibrium.
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P=130-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price. they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below 10 at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain your reason. B....
4. Bertrand Competition (29 points) Consider a Betrand Model. The market demand is P-130-Q, Consumers only buy from the firm charging a lower price. If the two firms charge the same price, they share the market equally. The marginal cost for firm 1 is 10, and the marginal cost for firm 2 is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. (5 points) Would any firm charge a price below your reason. at the market equilibrium? Briefly explain B. (6...
(16 points) Cournot Duopoly. Market demand is p(Q) = 50 – 4Q, where Q = 4+ 42. Firm 1's cost function is C (91) = 0, and firm 2 has a cost function C2(92) = 1092- The two firms engage in Cournot competition; they simultaneously choose a quantity and the price adjusts so that the market clears. (a) Formally write firm 1's profit maximization problem (b) Find firm l's best response function. (c) Take as given that firm 2's best...
Suppose two firms cannot collude and compete in the Cournot Model. Market demand is Q = 18 – P with the cost (c(Q) =*Q). a. Set up firm l's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm l's best response function. c. Solve for firm l's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
5. Cournot Competition Consider a Coumot duopoly model. Suppose that market demand is P-a-qi Also suppose that the cost functions of the two firms are TG (q) = q, and T( (a) Write the profit function, and the first order condition. (b) Find out the profit maximizing output for each firm. (c) Find the pofit earned by each firm, total profit eamed by the two fims to (d) Now assume that the two firms collude and act as a monopoly....
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