Question

How was GPHIN able to identify the SARS outbreak in China well before it was reported in the professional media or on “standard” communicable disease surveillance sites?

Answer 1

Ans) Recognizing that it would be impossible to address the vast array of potential microbial threats individually, public health policy makers are formulating general strategies to evaluate and respond to outbreaks of all kinds. At the international level, revisions to the International Health Regulations—rules concerning infectious disease that legally bind WHO member nations—have been underway since 1995, and are expected to be completed in 2005. Workshop participants concurred that efforts to address microbial threats should encompass and be enriched by existing strategies for defense against bioterrorism. As one participant noted, authorities do not know until well into an outbreak if it is a naturally occurring or manmade threat—in either case a robust and prepared system will be able to respond rapidly and effectively to contain disease spread.

- The importance of collaboration was a common theme among workshop discussions on research. It was discussed in the context of scientists around the globe who identified the causal agent of SARS, of veterinary and biomedical research communities studying zoonotic pathogens, and of private sector companies working in conjunction with government agencies and academia to develop antiviral drugs and vaccines.

Workshop participants considered what could be learned from the experience of SARS and how that knowledge could improve the public health community’s response to future outbreaks of infectious disease. The principal topics discussed include:

the early detection of outbreaks,
effective communication to the public in the event of an outbreak,
the promotion of research and development,
strategies for containment, and
multinational collaboration in implementing such strategies.

- The central response to SARS—surveillance and containment, when instituted promptly, rapidly, and effectively—applies to almost any microbial threat.

- It is clear that the initial delays in not only detecting the novel SCoV, but also alerting national and global health officials to the disease outbreak significantly increased the spread of SARS and its impact on affected countries.

- However, soon after the global outbreak alerts were issued, the timely recognition of the emergence of SARS in other countries proved to be an important factor in breaking all chains of transmission.

- The surveillance networks such as GOARN and GPHIN, supported by personnel and laboratories from 115 other partnerships, made this success ultimately possible. Along with these vital resources, workshop participants identified additional surveillance strategies for microbial threats; these include hospital-based surveillance systems capable of recognizing both known and novel diseases, and occupational clustering, with particular attention paid to illness in health care workers. Behavior-based surveillance could identify such phenomena as drug sales, or even such phenomena as the rapid rise in vinegar sales that occurred in response to SARS in Guangdong.