la)
Player 1:
Strategy B is dominant strategy for player 1: (4,8) > (3,2)
Player 2:
Strategy L is a dominant strategy for player 2: ( 3, 1) > (0, -1)
Hence, both will go with their dominant strategies.
Nash equilibrium: ( B:L)
b)
Player 1)
Strategy M has been weakly dominated by strategy U. Thus, M must be eliminated.
Player 2)
R has been dominated by the L. So R will be eliminated.
When M is deleted, the Player 2 is left with a strategy L
If player 2 selects the strategy L, only U will be selected.
Nash Equilibrium: ( U,L)
c)
Player 1)
Player 1 selects | Player 2 responds |
U | X |
M | Y |
D | X |
Player 2 selects | Player 1 responds |
W | U |
X | U |
Y | U |
Z | D |
Common Response is X, U.
Hence, it would be Nash Equilibrium: ( X,U)
d)
It clear from table that there are two Nash equilibrium in this game.
common response would be : (U,L) , (D,R)
Nash Equilibrium: ( U,L) and (D,R)
Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable strategies for the games 2 2...
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