d e f a 2,6 0,4 4,4 b 3,3 0,0 1,5 c 1,1 3,5 2,3...
d e f
a 2,6 0,4 4,4
b 3,3 0,0 1,5
c 1,1 3,5 2,3
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is_______ and player 2 moves at___________ information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
Homework Answers
Player 1 has 3 strategies (a,b,c)
Player 2 has 3 strategies (d,e,f).
Basically we need to count the strategies for each player to answer such questions
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.)
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A B 3,3 0,0 15 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A B 3,3 0,0 15 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is ike 0,1, 74, eta.). and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2...
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. The value of X that makes Player 1 randomize evenly between strategies A and C (i.e., play p=(12, 0, 1/2)) is [x]. Please, do not use fractional forms; if your answer is -1/2 use -0.5 instead
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5...
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
Which of the above 4 statements is correct? 12 c | 2,6 0,4 4,4 M 3,3...
Which of the above 4 statements is correct?
12 c | 2,6 0,4 4,4 M 3,3 3,3 0,0 / 1,5 D 1,1 3,5 2,3 If player 1 believes that player 2 never play C, then its best response would be a mixed strategy If player 2 believes that player 1 always play M, then its best response would be a mixed strategy. If player 2 has 30% chance to play L and 70% chance to play C, then the best...
Find the Nash equilibria of the games. X Y X Y Z 0,4 U 2,0 1,1...
Find the Nash equilibria of the games.
X Y X Y Z 0,4 U 2,0 1,1 3,3 3,3 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 | 0,2 3,0 (b) Y Z 5,1 0,2 U 8,6 8,2 M 0,1 4,6 6,0 M 1,0 2,6 5,1 2,1 3,5 2,8 2,8 0,8 4,4 х 0,0 8,10 4,1 3,10 4,1 B 0,0 3,3 6,4 8,5 6,4 8,5
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the...
PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the game in strategic form above. If player 1 plays A and player 2 plays E, Player 1's payoff is a. Impossible to determine. b. 2 C. d. 0)
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3...
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.)
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A B 3,3 0,0 15 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is ike 0,1, 74, eta.). and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. The value of X that makes Player 1 randomize evenly between strategies A and C (i.e., play p=(12, 0, 1/2)) is [x]. Please, do not use fractional forms; if your answer is -1/2 use -0.5 instead
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
Which of the above 4 statements is correct?
12 c | 2,6 0,4 4,4 M 3,3 3,3 0,0 / 1,5 D 1,1 3,5 2,3 If player 1 believes that player 2 never play C, then its best response would be a mixed strategy If player 2 believes that player 1 always play M, then its best response would be a mixed strategy. If player 2 has 30% chance to play L and 70% chance to play C, then the best...
Find the Nash equilibria of the games.
X Y X Y Z 0,4 U 2,0 1,1 3,3 3,3 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 | 0,2 3,0 (b) Y Z 5,1 0,2 U 8,6 8,2 M 0,1 4,6 6,0 M 1,0 2,6 5,1 2,1 3,5 2,8 2,8 0,8 4,4 х 0,0 8,10 4,1 3,10 4,1 B 0,0 3,3 6,4 8,5 6,4 8,5
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the game in strategic form above. If player 1 plays A and player 2 plays E, Player 1's payoff is a. Impossible to determine. b. 2 C. d. 0)
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
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