Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
Homework Answers
Above game has only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium as (C,E)
As we see when player 2 plays D the best response of player 1 is B but when player 1 plays B then player 2 best response is F
Player 2 best response for player 1's C is E and Player 1 best response for player 2's E is C
Hence this is Nash equilibrium (C,E)
In this game there is no Pareto efficient outcome hence Nash equilibrium is stable one
We have 01 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.)
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A B 3,3 0,0 15 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A B 3,3 0,0 15 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is ike 0,1, 74, eta.). and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values
d e f a 2,6 0,4 4,4 b 3,3 0,0 1,5 c 1,1 3,5 2,3...
d e f a 2,6 0,4 4,4 b 3,3 0,0 1,5 c 1,1 3,5 2,3 Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is_______ and player 2 moves at___________ information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5...
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. The value of X that makes Player 1 randomize evenly between strategies A and C (i.e., play p=(12, 0, 1/2)) is [x]. Please, do not use fractional forms; if your answer is -1/2 use -0.5 instead
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable strategies for the games 2 2...
Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable
strategies for the games
2 2 L R L С R 3,3 2,0 A 5,9 0, 1 U 4,3 В 4,1 8,- 3,2 М 0,9 1,1 D 0,1 2, 8 8,4 (а) (b) 2 2 1 W X Y Z R 3,6 4, 10 5,0 U 0,8 U 0,0 1, 1 2,6 3, 3 4, 10 1,1 0,0 5,5 D 1,5 2,9 3,0 4,6 (d) (c) L M
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select
all that apply.
a.
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is
a Nash equilibrium.
b.
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated.
c.
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that
.
d.
If a > b...
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above....
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are efficient (Please, select all that apply) a (AD) O c (B,D) d. (А,C)
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.)
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A B 3,3 0,0 15 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is ike 0,1, 74, eta.). and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. The value of X that makes Player 1 randomize evenly between strategies A and C (i.e., play p=(12, 0, 1/2)) is [x]. Please, do not use fractional forms; if your answer is -1/2 use -0.5 instead
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable
strategies for the games
2 2 L R L С R 3,3 2,0 A 5,9 0, 1 U 4,3 В 4,1 8,- 3,2 М 0,9 1,1 D 0,1 2, 8 8,4 (а) (b) 2 2 1 W X Y Z R 3,6 4, 10 5,0 U 0,8 U 0,0 1, 1 2,6 3, 3 4, 10 1,1 0,0 5,5 D 1,5 2,9 3,0 4,6 (d) (c) L M
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select
all that apply.
a.
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is
a Nash equilibrium.
b.
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated.
c.
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that
.
d.
If a > b...
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are efficient (Please, select all that apply) a (AD) O c (B,D) d. (А,C)
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