Homework Answers
Any strategy is efficient if there is no pareto improvement or given strategy is pareto efficient.
A) (A,D) is efficient
B) (B,D) is efficient
C)(B,C) is efficient
D)(A,C) is also efficient
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Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above....
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game...
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) b. (A,F C (C,E) d. (B,E) e (B,D) f. (A,D) . (B,F
QUESTION 4 Player II DE F 5,3 3,5 8,5 1,2 0,2 9,3 6,3 2,4 8,9 A...
QUESTION 4 Player II DE F 5,3 3,5 8,5 1,2 0,2 9,3 6,3 2,4 8,9 A B C Player ' Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) a. (B,E) b. (CD) C. (CE) d. (A,F) €. (B,D) Of. (B,F) 9. (A,D)
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. The value of X that makes Player 1 randomize evenly between strategies A and C (i.e., play p=(12, 0, 1/2)) is [x]. Please, do not use fractional forms; if your answer is -1/2 use -0.5 instead
Player II Player a,b B cdgh Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B,...
Player II Player a,b B cdgh Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select all that apply. a. If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that a 2 C b.Ifband d-hthen D is weakly dominated C. If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is a Nash equilibrium. d. Ifa> b and e...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.)
Player Il D EF A 5,3 3,5 8,5 В 1,2 0,2 9,3 С 6,3 2,4 8,9...
Player Il D EF A 5,3 3,5 8,5 В 1,2 0,2 9,3 С 6,3 2,4 8,9 Player The game above has a Nash Equilibrium in which Player 1 plays strategy and Player 2 plays strategy E with probability at least (Please, do not use fractions, if your answer is 2/5 use 0.4)
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2...
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which...
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
Player lI C D Player A 6,3 2,6 В 4,3 8,1 Suppose that in the game...
Player lI C D Player A 6,3 2,6 В 4,3 8,1 Suppose that in the game above Player 2 plays strategy C with probability q:03. The value for ET71(A, q) is: a. 8.3 b. 3.2 C.3.9 d. 4.6
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) b. (A,F C (C,E) d. (B,E) e (B,D) f. (A,D) . (B,F
QUESTION 4 Player II DE F 5,3 3,5 8,5 1,2 0,2 9,3 6,3 2,4 8,9 A B C Player ' Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) a. (B,E) b. (CD) C. (CE) d. (A,F) €. (B,D) Of. (B,F) 9. (A,D)
Player II A x5 0,4 4,4 В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. The value of X that makes Player 1 randomize evenly between strategies A and C (i.e., play p=(12, 0, 1/2)) is [x]. Please, do not use fractional forms; if your answer is -1/2 use -0.5 instead
Player II Player a,b B cdgh Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select all that apply. a. If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that a 2 C b.Ifband d-hthen D is weakly dominated C. If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is a Nash equilibrium. d. Ifa> b and e...
Player II A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2 moves at information sets (Please write numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.)
Player Il D EF A 5,3 3,5 8,5 В 1,2 0,2 9,3 С 6,3 2,4 8,9 Player The game above has a Nash Equilibrium in which Player 1 plays strategy and Player 2 plays strategy E with probability at least (Please, do not use fractions, if your answer is 2/5 use 0.4)
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
Player lI C D Player A 6,3 2,6 В 4,3 8,1 Suppose that in the game above Player 2 plays strategy C with probability q:03. The value for ET71(A, q) is: a. 8.3 b. 3.2 C.3.9 d. 4.6
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