In the question, it is given that player 2 will choose strategy C with probability 0.3
So the probability of strategy D chosen by player 2 will be =(1 - 0.3) = 0.7
In the question , we are asked to find out the expected profit of player 1 if he chooses strategy A.
Player 1 will have a profit of 6 when he chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy C. And we know that probability of player 2 choosing strategy C is 0.3.
Player 1 will have a profit of 2 when he chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy D. And we know that probability of player 2 choosing strategy D is 0.7.
Expected profit = Profit * probability of having profit
So, expected profit = 6*0.3 + 2*0.7 = 1.8 + 1.4 = 3.2
So option B is the correct answer.
Player lI C D Player A 6,3 2,6 В 4,3 8,1 Suppose that in the game...
Player II C D __________________ Player 1 A 6,3 2,6 B 4,3 8,1 Suppose that in the game above Player 2 plays strategy C with probability q=0.3. The value for is: A) 3.9 B) 4.6 C) 8.3 D) 3.2
Player Il D EF A 5,3 3,5 8,5 В 1,2 0,2 9,3 С 6,3 2,4 8,9 Player The game above has a Nash Equilibrium in which Player 1 plays strategy and Player 2 plays strategy E with probability at least (Please, do not use fractions, if your answer is 2/5 use 0.4)
Player Il Player lI Player lI A 2,3,1 3,1,0 В 3,2,11,32 Player I A 1,3,3 -1,3,2 Player l В 3,1,0 0,0,4 The game above is a simultaneous three player game between players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 chooses between A and B, Player 2 between C and D and Player 3 between E and F. In the game above, the strategy profile in which Player 1 plays and Player 3 plays Player 2 plays is a Nash Equilibrium profile.
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are efficient (Please, select all that apply) a (AD) O c (B,D) d. (А,C)
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) b. (A,F C (C,E) d. (B,E) e (B,D) f. (A,D) . (B,F
Player lI Player 2-2 x120 В 3,18 13,13 In the game above, the minimum value of X such that (A,D) is a Nash Equilibrium is [x]. Please, provide a numerical answer (i.e., write 2 instead of two)
PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the game in strategic form above. If player 1 plays A and player 2 plays E, Player 1's payoff is a. Impossible to determine. b. 2 C. d. 0)