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Player Il D EF A 5,3 3,5 8,5 В 1,2 0,2 9,3 С 6,3 2,4 8,9 Player The game above has a Nash Equilibrium in which Player 1 plays strategy and Player 2 plays strategy E with probability at least (Please, do not use fractions, if your answer is 2/5 use 0.4)

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ur can delek D ande haue plyen丑 2.,4 8,9 Betwen A and B playaris playing p and B urit pnobability-P) han playe ith pmobabil ty is Payops fom this strategy 3p+(-P)o 3P2 since P is betuen when Playen plays F and plagen1 Ploys O and l l-P His Paye佯 fron his strategy oand r So playen 2 sid not ply c as cives playen 2 plays E) or hnplayen plays F) So c cald beb eliuina tedPlayen I 3,S 9,3 p layen 2plays A ,best stralegy for Player 고 isto choo se either E or uhen Playerplarys B, best sthategy or playen D is to choose F when playen plays , bes t sthategy fr playen T is to choose A When Player교 plays F, best strategy Br Playen 2 is to choose So, there is no Pails nash egil Faem We check for mixed Strategy plamen oith probahility p) Playen sih pomobabiliy pand F E Lur orth Pzoha ilty 4-2)

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