Homework Answers
Answer. All four parts.
Reason-
A) Strategy A is not dominant for player 1, when player 2 plays C and D , player 1 plays B.
B) Strategy B is weekly dominant for player 1. As there is atleast 1 strategy where payoff for B is more than A. when player 2 plays C and D , player 1 plays B.
C) Strategy E is dominated by strategy C and D for player 2. Whether player 1 plays A or B, playwer 2 never plays E.
D) Strategy E is never a best response because player 2 never plays E.
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PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the...
PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the game in strategic form above. If player 1 plays A and player 2 plays E, Player 1's payoff is a. Impossible to determine. b. 2 C. d. 0)
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player...
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player Consider the game above. Select all that apply. a Strategy B weakly dominates C. Strategy D weakly dominates E. c. The game does not have a dominant strategy solution. d. F is a dominant strategy. e. (A,D) is the dominant strategy solution.
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3...
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A...
Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A The payoff matrix shows Player A having two moves (A, and A2) and Player B having two moves (B, and B2). In each cell, Player A's payoff is on the left and Player B's payoff is on the right. What is the dominant strategy for each player assuming that they play/choose simultaneously. Select one: a. Dominant strategies are A, B1. O b. Dominant strategies...
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative...
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy for Player 1 and for Player 2 strategy
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy for Player 1 and for Player 2 strategy
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5...
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1...
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select
all that apply.
a.
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is
a Nash equilibrium.
b.
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated.
c.
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that
.
d.
If a > b...
PlayerI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the game in strategic form above. If player 1 plays A and player 2 plays E, Player 1's payoff is a. Impossible to determine. b. 2 C. d. 0)
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player Consider the game above. Select all that apply. a Strategy B weakly dominates C. Strategy D weakly dominates E. c. The game does not have a dominant strategy solution. d. F is a dominant strategy. e. (A,D) is the dominant strategy solution.
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A The payoff matrix shows Player A having two moves (A, and A2) and Player B having two moves (B, and B2). In each cell, Player A's payoff is on the left and Player B's payoff is on the right. What is the dominant strategy for each player assuming that they play/choose simultaneously. Select one: a. Dominant strategies are A, B1. O b. Dominant strategies...
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy for Player 1 and for Player 2 strategy
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy for Player 1 and for Player 2 strategy
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select
all that apply.
a.
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is
a Nash equilibrium.
b.
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated.
c.
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that
.
d.
If a > b...
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