Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A...

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Answer 1

Answer #1

Irrespective of the decisich of Playes B, the pay off from move A, is always highes for playes As is the dominant Strategy Si

Answer 2

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