Homework Answers
Here, option B is correct.
Because, given that the game will start from player B.
Now, player B can easily conclude from the payoff table that if he go with B2 then he will be able to maximize his payoffs.
Also, player B knows that his opponent is also rational he will select the strategy which will give him maximum payoffs.
Hence, player A for maximising his payoffs will choose strategy A2.
So, option B.
Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A...
Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A The payoff matrix shows Player A having two moves (A, and A2) and Player B having two moves (B, and B2). In each cell, Player A's payoff is on the left and Player B's payoff is on the right. What is the dominant strategy for each player assuming that they play/choose simultaneously. Select one: a. Dominant strategies are A, B1. O b. Dominant strategies...
3. Consider the game illustrated by the payoff matrix below: Jeffrey B1 B2 -4,- 4 1...
3. Consider the game illustrated by the payoff matrix below: Jeffrey B1 B2 -4,- 4 1 ,-6 Curtis A2 -6,1 0,0 b. Suppose that the game is repeated 10 times and assume a discount factor 8 (where 0< 8 < 1). i. [2] What does each player choose to do in the 10th round of play? ii. [2] Can Curtis and Jeffrey credibly commit to playing (A2, B2) in any of the rounds that they play? c. Suppose now that...
(a) Let P(B1∩B2)>0, and A1∪A2⊂B1∩B2. Then show that P(A1|B1).P(A2|B2)=P(A1|B2).P(A2|B1). (b) Let A and B1 be independent;...
(a) Let P(B1∩B2)>0, and A1∪A2⊂B1∩B2. Then show that P(A1|B1).P(A2|B2)=P(A1|B2).P(A2|B1). (b) Let A and B1 be independent; similarly, let A and B2 be independent. Show that in this case, A and B1∪B2 are independent if and only if A and B1∩B2 are independent. (c) Given P(A) = 0.42,P(B) = 0.25, and P(A∩B) = 0.17, find (i)P(A∪B) ; (ii)P(A∩Bc) ; (iii)P(Ac∩Bc) ; (iv)P(Ac|Bc).
In the following game, all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the...
In the following game, all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second (14-15) Player B B1 B2 Player A AL 5,6 7,2 A2 4,5 9,1 4. In game above, a) Player A choosing As and Player B choosing Be is a Nash equilibrium. b) Player A choosing Az and Player B choosing Ba is a Nash equilibrium. c) there is no Nash equilibrium. d) there are multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Consider the competitive, static, one-time game depicted in the following figure. If larger payoffs are preferred,...
Consider the competitive, static, one-time game depicted in the following figure. If larger payoffs are preferred, does either player have a dominant strategy? If B believes that A will move A1, how should B move? If B believes that A will move A2, how should B move? What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile if this game is played just once? What is the strategy profile for this game if both players adopt a secure strategy? What strategy profile results...
Choose a,b,c,d 12. In the game above, who has dominant strategy? A) Player A has a...
Choose a,b,c,d
12. In the game above, who has dominant strategy? A) Player A has a dominant strategy C) B) Player B has a dominant strategy Both players have dominant strategies. D) Neither player has a dominant strategy 13. Which one is the Nash equilibrium? A) firm A competition, firm B competition. C) firm A collusion, firm B competition. B) firm A competition, firm B collusion. D) firm A collusion, firm B collusion. In the following game, all payoffs are...
Consider the following two player game. The players’ strategy spaces are SA = {a1, a2, a3}...
Consider the following two player game. The players’ strategy
spaces are SA = {a1, a2, a3} and SB = {b1, b2, b3, b4}.
(d) Derive all the rationalizable strategy profiles.
(e) Derive the players’ best reply correspondences.
(f) Compute all the Nash equilibria of the game
A\В by 2, 2 3, 1 8,0 3, 6 а1 3, 1 0, 6 1, 4 1, 0 а2 4, 2 1, 1 2, 2 4, 4 аз
A\В by 2, 2 3, 1...
11. The demand for a monopolist's product is given by Q - 400 4P while the...
11. The demand for a monopolist's product is given by Q - 400 4P while the monopolist's marginal cost is given by MC-2Q The profit-maximizing quantity of output for this monopolist is A) 100 C) 40 B) 44-44 D) 20 There is a payoff matrix of two firms; their different profits are listed when they choose collusion or competition (answer 14-15). firm B collusion 27.5 19, 19 competition competition14, 14 5. 28 firm A collusion 12. In the game above,...
5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2...
5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2 A2 B2 C2 A1 20, 22 24, 20 25, 24 B1 23,26 21,24 22, 23 C1 19, 25 23,17 26,26 Player1 STUDENT NUMBER: SECTION: Page 11 of 12 pages Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this simultaneous choice, one play game. Explain your reasoning. a) b) Draw the game in extended form and solve assuming sequential choice, with player 2 choosing first.
Question 3: [5pt total] Consider the following game: Player 1 Player 2 X Y Z A...
Question 3: [5pt total] Consider the following game: Player 1 Player 2 X Y Z A 4,0 -3,8 -7, -1 B-4,3 0,6 9,5 C3,2 2,-1 11, 9 Let B1(-) and B2(-) be the best response function for player 1 and player 2 respectively. Calculate the following: 3)a) [1pt] B1(X) 3)b) [1pt] B2(B) 3)c) (1pt] Social Welfare Maximum: 3)d) [1pt] Dominant Strategies for Player 1: 3)) [1pt] Pure Nash Equilibriums:
Player B Move B Move B2 4,2 1,1 2,1 0,0 Move A1 Move A2 Player A The payoff matrix shows Player A having two moves (A, and A2) and Player B having two moves (B, and B2). In each cell, Player A's payoff is on the left and Player B's payoff is on the right. What is the dominant strategy for each player assuming that they play/choose simultaneously. Select one: a. Dominant strategies are A, B1. O b. Dominant strategies...
3. Consider the game illustrated by the payoff matrix below: Jeffrey B1 B2 -4,- 4 1 ,-6 Curtis A2 -6,1 0,0 b. Suppose that the game is repeated 10 times and assume a discount factor 8 (where 0< 8 < 1). i. [2] What does each player choose to do in the 10th round of play? ii. [2] Can Curtis and Jeffrey credibly commit to playing (A2, B2) in any of the rounds that they play? c. Suppose now that...
In the following game, all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second (14-15) Player B B1 B2 Player A AL 5,6 7,2 A2 4,5 9,1 4. In game above, a) Player A choosing As and Player B choosing Be is a Nash equilibrium. b) Player A choosing Az and Player B choosing Ba is a Nash equilibrium. c) there is no Nash equilibrium. d) there are multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Choose a,b,c,d
12. In the game above, who has dominant strategy? A) Player A has a dominant strategy C) B) Player B has a dominant strategy Both players have dominant strategies. D) Neither player has a dominant strategy 13. Which one is the Nash equilibrium? A) firm A competition, firm B competition. C) firm A collusion, firm B competition. B) firm A competition, firm B collusion. D) firm A collusion, firm B collusion. In the following game, all payoffs are...
Consider the following two player game. The players’ strategy
spaces are SA = {a1, a2, a3} and SB = {b1, b2, b3, b4}.
(d) Derive all the rationalizable strategy profiles.
(e) Derive the players’ best reply correspondences.
(f) Compute all the Nash equilibria of the game
A\В by 2, 2 3, 1 8,0 3, 6 а1 3, 1 0, 6 1, 4 1, 0 а2 4, 2 1, 1 2, 2 4, 4 аз
A\В by 2, 2 3, 1...
11. The demand for a monopolist's product is given by Q - 400 4P while the monopolist's marginal cost is given by MC-2Q The profit-maximizing quantity of output for this monopolist is A) 100 C) 40 B) 44-44 D) 20 There is a payoff matrix of two firms; their different profits are listed when they choose collusion or competition (answer 14-15). firm B collusion 27.5 19, 19 competition competition14, 14 5. 28 firm A collusion 12. In the game above,...
5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2 A2 B2 C2 A1 20, 22 24, 20 25, 24 B1 23,26 21,24 22, 23 C1 19, 25 23,17 26,26 Player1 STUDENT NUMBER: SECTION: Page 11 of 12 pages Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this simultaneous choice, one play game. Explain your reasoning. a) b) Draw the game in extended form and solve assuming sequential choice, with player 2 choosing first.
Question 3: [5pt total] Consider the following game: Player 1 Player 2 X Y Z A 4,0 -3,8 -7, -1 B-4,3 0,6 9,5 C3,2 2,-1 11, 9 Let B1(-) and B2(-) be the best response function for player 1 and player 2 respectively. Calculate the following: 3)a) [1pt] B1(X) 3)b) [1pt] B2(B) 3)c) (1pt] Social Welfare Maximum: 3)d) [1pt] Dominant Strategies for Player 1: 3)) [1pt] Pure Nash Equilibriums:
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
-
If you mixed 35.0 mLmL of 0.100 M Tris-HCl with 65.0
mLmL of 0.200 M Tris-base, what would...
asked 2 minutes ago -
Which force do you think wields a stronger influence over our
ethical behavior – our personal...
asked 7 minutes ago -
11.1 In the northeast
regions of the United States and in eastern Canada, many people
heat their...
asked 6 minutes ago -
Explain traveling wave theory. Explain how the peaking of the
wave leads to action potentials and...
asked 5 minutes ago -
What is the entropy change to the surroundings when 1 mol of ice
melts in someone's...
asked 8 minutes ago -
Are adult gamers less likely to use a gaming console (Xbox,
PlayStation, Wii, etc...) than teen...
asked 13 minutes ago -
Pt1
An electrochemical cell is set up at 25°C based on the overall
reaction represented by...
asked 14 minutes ago -
Bruin, Inc., has identified the following two mutually
exclusive projects:
Year
Cash Flow (A)
Cash...
asked 16 minutes ago -
A mutual fund salesperson has arranged to call on four people
tomorrow. Based on past experience...
asked 19 minutes ago -
The decomposition of SO2Cl2 is first order
and has a rate constant of + 2.90 x...
asked 42 minutes ago -
A solid, frictionless cylindrical reel of mass M=5.00kg and
radius R=0.55m is used to draw water...
asked 1 hour ago -
The work done by the spring's restoring force
on the free end of a spring while...
asked 36 minutes ago